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MASSIVE RESISTANCE-THE RHETORIC AND
THE REALITY
JUDITH A. HAGLEY"
I. INTRODUCTION
"Massive Resistance" was a term coined in the 1950s to describe the southern'
states' response to Brown v. Board of Education.2 It was the first time since the
Civil War that states banded together and said "no" to the federal government.3
Massive Resistance, however, was more than a crisis in federalism, it was a crisis
of national conscience in the face of murders, bombings, riots, and racist rhetoric.
It was a campaign of terror directed against black citizens in the South, a
campaign backed by a political and social structure that said "segregation now!
segregation tomorrow! segregation forever!" While Massive Resistance is a
burden of our country's history, it is, thankfully, just that--history.
Recently, the term "Massive Resistance" has reemerged in academic 4 and
popular5 literature to describe those who support affirmative action as courts
Lecturer, St. John's University School of Law. B.A., 1987, University of Dallas; J.D., 1990, University
of Notre Dame; LL.M. candidate. New York University. I am grateful for the helpful comments of John
Ferejohn, Russell Jackson, Larry Kramer, Jonathan Lawlor, and Gregory McAndrew.
1. References to the "South" or "southern" in this Article include the eleven states of the old Confederacy:
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi. North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
and Virginia.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). What is usually referred to as "Brown v. Board of Education" was actually five
separate cases: one from a state in the Deep South (South Carolina), one in the Upper South (Virginia), one from
a border state (Delaware), one from the Midwest (Kansas), and one from the capital of the federal government
(District of Columbia). The four state cases were consolidated by the United States Supreme Court and referred
to as "Brown." The Court wrote a separate opinion for the case from the District of Columbia, Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954). However, because Boiling v. Sharpe does not raise the federalism concerns of the other state
cases, I do not discuss it. Throughout this Article, I refer to the Court's first Brown opinion as "Brown" and its later
implementation decision, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), as "Brown i."
3. See MAm V. TusHNEr, MARINO CrvuL ROhrs LAw: TURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREM
COURT 1936-1961240 (1994) (discussing the Southern Manifesto in which southern politicians joined to oppose
Brown).
4. See Kirk A. Kennedy. Race-Exclusive Scholarships: Conmiutional Vel Non, 30 WAKE FOREST L REV.
759,781 n.146 (1995) ("College administrators have responded to Podberesky [v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir.
1994) (striking down race-based scholarships)] in a manner reminiscent of the southern response to Brown v.
Board of Education."); Cory Todd Wilson, Note, Mississippi Learning: Curriculum for the Post-Brown Era
of Higher Education Desegregation. 104 YALE L.J. 243, 263-67 (1994) (comparing special interest groups'
resistance to United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992), in which the Supreme Court questioned the
existence of historically black state universities, to Massive Resistance of the 1950s).
5. See Peter Applebome, Universities Troubled by Decision limiting Admission Preferences. N.Y. TIMES.
Mar. 21, 1996, at Al, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library. NYT File, at 6 (Michael McDonald, president
of the Center for Individual Rights in Washington, believes that affirmative action has been illegal since the
1980s "regardless of the massive resistance on the part of the educational establishment" (emphasis added));
John Hall, Commentary: Clinton. Battered Democrats Are Starting to Show a Pulse, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPAmC. Mar. 19. 1995, at F2. available in WESTLAW, RCHMDTD database, 1995 WL 2509874, at *3
("Calls to stop affirmative action had been building into a potentially damaging racial controversy. Clinton,
instead of offering massive resistance, ordered a study of all racial and sex preference ... " (emphasis added));
Ross Mackenzie, On Tobacco, Mr. Hillary, Bosnia, Stumpf Episcopalians. Etc.. RICHMOND TIMES-DSPATCH,
Mar. 24. 1996, at F7, available in WESTLAW. RCHMDTD database. 1996 WL 2294665. at *6 ("In thrall to
the god of 'diversity,' the education establishment has practiced massive resistance against the dismantling of
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
move toward banning the practice.6 As legal historian William Nelson has
stated, "[tfhe essence of history is the identification of continuities and
discontinuities between past and present ... ." As this Article will show, the
current use of the term "Massive Resistance" is ahistorical--treating discontinuous
events as continuous-and, therefore, has no place in the ongoing debates over
affirmative action. By explaining the genesis of the term Massive Resistance in
both its historical and legal context, this Article clears anachronistic clutter from
current affirmative action debates. Moreover, this Article offers guidance for the
future as we enter a period of turbulence and change in both our race-relations
jurisprudence' and federalism jurisprudence.9 To understand where we are going
affirmative action in a very big way." (emphasis added)); Paul Craig Roberts, Now Let Congress Legislate End
to Racial Quotas, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Mar. 28, 1996, at 14, available in WESTLAW, MLWK database,
1996 WL 7841581, at *3 ("'[D]iversity' has nullified both the Constitution and statutory law. Without the
clarification and authority of a federal statute, the Fifth Circuit's ruling [in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996) (banning affirmative action in law school admissions),] will meet with
massive resistance from university administrations." (emphasis added)); David E. Rovella, Circuit Ruling
Challenges "Bakke," Threatens Law School Diversity, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 1, 1996, at A15, available in
WESTLAW, NJ database, at *5 (Michael McDonald states: "The educational establishment has been engaged
in massive resistance to the high court's rulings .... " (emphasis added)); see also Testimony of Raymond P.
Fitzpatrick, Jr., U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities (May
2, 1994), DAILY LABOR REPORT, May 3. 1995, at 587, available in LEXIS/NEXIS. BNA Library, DLABRT
File, at *6 ("While the Supreme Court has tried to limit affirmative action by public employers, many
governmental employers have ignored the fine points of the Court's decisions governing limited affirmative
action and implemented administratively-simple quota programs.").
6. During the past two years, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits--covering most of the southern states--have
issued rulings drastically limiting, ff not outlawing, affirmative action. See Podberesky, 38 F.3d 147 (banning
race-based scholarships); Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932 (banning affirmative action in law school admissions). While
denying certiorari in both of these cases, the United States Supreme Court itself has severely constrained
affirmative action by both the states and the federal government See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down a minority set-aside program in the construction industry that had been adopted
by the Richmond city council and holding that racial classifications by state actors are subject to strict scrutiny,
even those that are remedial); Adarand Constructors. Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct 2097 (1995) (holding that racial
classifications by federal actors are subject to strict scrutiny, even those classifications that are remedial).
Michael Greve, the Executive Director of the Center for Individual Rights, an organization that represented
the plaintiffs in Hopwood, has gone so far as to compare explicitly the old segregationists and current
institutions. Michael Greve, Speaker at The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Symposium on
Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Race, Gender, and the Constitution (Apr. 16, 1996).
7. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. FROM POLInCAL PRUCNPLES TO JUDICIAL
DocrRINE 11 (1988).
8. As we stand in the eye of the storm that is the debate over affirmative action, it has been suggested that
America has reached a critical juncture in its race relations, similar to that faced by the Supreme Court--and
the country-in 1954 when Brown was decided. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Law of Civil Rights and
the Dangers of Separatism in Multicultural America, 47 STAN. L. REv. 993, 994 (1995). Judge Wilkinson
describes the fork in the road as "[w]hether we will be a nation of interracial union or a nation of separate racial
enclaves." Id
See generally BARBARA R. BERGMANN, IN DEFENSE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996); CLINT BOLICK, THE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FRAUD: CAN WE RESTORE THE AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS VISION (1996); TERRY
EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE CASE FOR COLORBLIJND JuSTICE (1996).
9. In decisions issued in its last few terms, the Court has indicated that it is willing to re-examine the proper
scope of federal power under the Constitution. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1126 (1996)
(holding that Congress lacks authority under the Indian commerce clause to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. CL 1624, 1626 (1995) (striking down a federal statute as beyond
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in these two areas, we must clearly know where we have been. To understand
where we have been, we must revisit the last major collision of those
topics-Brown and Massive Resistance. Specifically, this Article focuses on the
federalism principles'0 that were both used and abused during Massive
Resistance, principles that are usually lost in discussions of Brown and its
progeny." One cannot truly understand Brown without analyzing the federalism
context in which it was decided.
A. Brown and Federalism
Brown v. Board of Education is described as a "transformation in the nature of
American federalism."' 2 Further, Brown is used to mark the date that the United
the reach of the Commerce Clause). Historian Alan Brinkley has warned that, after Lopez, the Court is "one vote
away... from fundamentally redefining the limits of Federal power in a way that could undo decades of social and
economic policy." Alan Brinkley, Big Government Is a Check, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 18. 1996, at 37, availabe
in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, NYT File. Although some constitutional scholars argue that we should relinquish
the concept of limits on federal power, clearly the Supreme Court is not ready to do so. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin
& Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903,950 (1994) (Federa-
lism is merely "a neurosis, a dysfunctional belief to which we cling despite its irrelevance to present circum-
stances.").
10. While no case has received as much attention and discussion as the Brown decision, I have attempted
to isolate the federalism aspect of the case, ignoring the myriad other issues that surround the decision. This
endeavor necessarily involves suspension of moral judgment.
In addition, by consciously depicting only one aspect, this Article gains a clearer view of the federalism
theme at the cost of diminishing the fuller complexity of the Brown story. One should keep in mind Randall
Kennedy's admonition:
Although the struggle to desegregate public schools in the United States is often portrayed
as a triumph of principle over prejudice, the reality is more complicated and sobering ....
A haunting reminder of the troubled history of desegregation in public schooling is that
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka remained an ongoing case thirty-five years after the
Supreme Court's landmark ruling. Linda Brown, the little girl for whom the case is named,
herself became a parent alleging that her children's constitutional rights were violated by a
state's failure to desegregate fully its public schools.
Randall Kennedy, Racial Desegregation, in THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 898, 899 (Eric
Foner et al. eds., 1991).
11. In the four decades that have passed since Brown was decided, there has been a "seemingly endless
articulation of dissatisfaction with the opinion." Norman C. Amaker, The Haunting Presence of the Opinion in
Brown v. Board of Education, 20 S. ILL. U. LU. 3 (1995). Most of the scholarship on Brown ignores the federalism
dimension of the case and the events that followed it. The usual themes of this scholarship are: (1) Brown did not
express a neutral principle; (2) Brown was a sociological opinion that relied on faulty social science; and (3) Brown.
relying on the Fourteenth Amendment, did not accurately reflect the intent of that Amendment. See, e.g., Alexander
M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955) (critique based
on intent); Edmund Calm, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150 (1955) (critique of social science used in Brown);
Steven D. Smith, Brown v. Board of Education: A Revised Opinion, 20 S. ILL. U. LJ. 41,42 (1995) (Court should
be "reluctant to base the resolution of an important constitutional issue on the transitory conclusions of social
scientists."); Mark Tushnet, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867,
1919 (1991) (critique based on intent); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law. 73
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959) (criticizes reasoning in Brown for failure to find neutral principle). But see Michael W.
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995) (defending Brown on the
basis of an original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment).
12. GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION Op SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS AND THE 1964 CrVUL
RIGHTS ACT 305, 349 (1969) ("The simple task of bringing children of a darker shade into classrooms formerly
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States Supreme Court abandoned federalism concerns altogether.1 3  These
proclamations are based more on what Brown has come to symbolize-the
catalyst for the 1950s Civil Rights Movement-than on the intent of the Brown
Court. Brown is more accurately viewed as a test of federalism. The American
federal system was constructed as a highly decentralized set of power
relationships, better suited to preserving the status quo than to accommodating
social change. Thus, the question for the Brown Court in the 1950s was how to
make the institutions of federalism work to protect the rights of black citizens.
Burke Marshall, the head of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division during
the early 1960s, concluded that the institutions of federalism were incapable of
providing this protection. 4 The federal system had failed and the rights of blacks
could be protected only by bringing the full weight of national power into
play 15  This conclusion is only partially correct-the federal government has
never preempted the states in the area of education and Brown II continues as an
exercise in cooperative federalism. 6
Because the Court's efforts to cooperate with the states in the context of
federalism are usually overlooked by Brown commentators, this Article considers
the Court's offer to cooperate with the southern states and the response to that
offer. The southern response to Brown can be defined by four successive
stages:1 7 "absolute defiance" of Brown," termed "Massive Resistance," lasting
from 1955 until the failure of the school closing strategies in 1959; (2) "token
reserved for whites alone has demanded a historic restructuring of national-state relations and has constituted
a fundamental element of an unprecedented peacetime social revolution." (emphasis added)).
13. See DAAN BRAVEMAN & WnIIAM C. BANKS, CONSTnUONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND RioHTS IN OUR
FEDERAL SYSTEM 244 (1987); see also Bernard James & Julie M. Hoffman, Brown in State Hands: State
Policymaking and Educational Equality After Freeman v. Pitts, 20 HASTiNGS CONST. L.Q. 521, 522 (1993)
(Brown "dismissed what remained of the concept of states rights .... ").
14. See BURKE MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTs 2, 83 (1964).
15. See id.
16. The phrase "cooperative federalism" usually refers to the practice of giving federal money to state and
local officials to further federal objectives through decentralized and flexible implementation (also known as
"conditional grant programs"), a practice which became widespread during the New Deal. Cooperative federalism
replaced the paradigm of dual federalism, that is, the concept that the federal and state governments each had
their own, separate territories. See Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REv. 917, 957 (1985).
In this Article, I use the term "cooperative federalism" to describe the Court's attempt to share power, rather
than money, with the states in order to attain a decentralized and flexible implementation of its decision(s).
Stewart notes that conditional grant programs have come under attack and are "increasingly viewed as
instruments of a co-optive and coercive federalism rather than a cooperative one." Id. at 958. As shown, infra
Part Ill, Brown's experiment in cooperative federalism, by using shared decision-making rather than money to
entice the states, was less coercive than conditional grants. However, it was also less effective-apparently
money talks and dicta walks.
17. See J. HARViE WILKINSON 1H. FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL
INTEGRATION: 1954-1978 78 (1979). Wilkinson recognizes that the history of the period can not be placed so
neatly in these broad categories: "During the defiant stage, for example, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
Florida practiced token compliance. And, during much of the token compliance stage, Mississippi, Alabama, and
South Carolina practiced total defiance." Id However, his phases seem to accurately express the general
regional momentum as a whole and not the experience of any particular state. It goes without saying that things
did not end in 1974--the country as a whole continues to this day to "respond" to Brown.
18. See id
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compliance," lasting from 1959 until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;19
(3) "modest integration," from 1965 until 1968, and representing "the efforts of
southern school officials to avoid fund cutoffs by the [U.S.] Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare[," as authorized by the Civil Rights Act of 1964;' and (4)
"massive integration," beginning in 1968, with the Court's opinion in Green v.
County School Board,21 and ending in 1974, with the Court's opinion in Milliken
v. Bradley.22 This Article focuses on the first stage, Massive Resistance.
B. Article Focus
Part II of this Article examines the United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on
education and segregation prior to Brown, concentrating on the Court's federalism
concerns. Before the New Deal, the Court completely deferred to state authority
over education matters. The Court allowed the states to segregate schools without
inquiring as to whether those schools were equal. However, after the New Deal, the
Court began to strictly enforce the "equal" aspect of the "separate but equal"
doctrine in education.
Part III of this Article analyzes Brown and Brown I. Brown failed to address the
federalism concerns outlined in Part 11. Brown's deficiencies left the Court
vulnerable to accusations that the federal government was improperly encroaching
on state interests. As a result, federalism concerns dictated the results in Brown II.
In determining how to enforce Brown, the Court decided to mandate desegregation
on the federal level and leave enforcement to state and local officials. Brown I
represents the Court's attempt to cut a deal with the southern states by adopting their
suggestions and giving the southern states primary responsibility for Brown's
implementation. Similarly, by delegating the duty to oversee the states' implementa-
tion of Brown to local federal judges-hybrids of national and state interests-the
Court attempted to work within the confines of federalism. For decades, federalism
had sustained black subordination by making Jim Crow a local problem. The Court
in Brown II attempted to alleviate this dilemma with the least disruption possible to
the prevailing federal-state balance.
Part IV of this Article describes the Massive Resistance stage of the southern
response to Brown. During this period, the Court's attempt to cultivate cooperation
with the states was undermined by the other two branches of the federal government.
For the most part, President Eisenhower spurned Brown, and Congress attacked the
Court through the Southern Manifesto23 and other proposed legislation. The
19. See id
20. Id.
21. See id (citing Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,439-40 (1968) (invalidating "freedom of choice"
plans, i.e., desegregation plans that purported to allow students to choose the schools they wished to attend)).
22. See generally id. at 216-49, 263 (citing and discussing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 767 (1974)
(reversing lower court order requiring inter-district desegregation remedy)). The issue in Milliken was "whether
courts could use suburban pupils to desegregate inner city schools." Id at 218. The Court answered the query
in the negative. See id. at 222.
23. The Southern Manifesto was a proclamation denouncing Brown as an illegal usurpation of state control
over education and asserting the right of states to ignore the Court. See The Southern Manifesto, 102 CONG. REc.
3948 (1956), reprinted in 1 RAcE REL L. REP. 435-37 (1956) [hereinafter Southern Manifesto].
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southern states, alleging that their authority had been unconstitutionally usurped,
defied the Court by enacting interposition resolutions' and other anti-integration
legislation. In this context, the rise of a third political party aimed at "reversing"
Brown also is discussed. Although the southern states ultimately failed to nullify
Brown, the Court's efforts to create cooperation were nevertheless frustrated by the
political process and by the Democratic and Republican parties, delaying Brown's
implementation.
Part V analyzes the Little Rock, Arkansas school crisis (Little Rock Crisis) as
a test of the Brown experiment in federalism, and the Court's response to it in
Cooper v. Aaron.' The conventional story of the Little Rock Crisis portrays a
President using military force to subjugate state officials. However, in actuality,
the opposite situation was true-local and state officials begged the federal
government to intervene in Little Rock. The Court responded to the Little Rock
Crisis in Cooper. The Court in Cooper made clear to the southern states that
Massive Resistance was unconstitutional and segregationists were outlaws.
Defying desegregation was not an option-the only option that the states had was
when and how much to integrate, not whether to do so.
Part VI describes the demise of Massive Resistance. Massive Resistance fell
into disfavor in southern politics when the assault on public education and the
threat to the entire social structure and economic future of the South engendered
a moderation movement. Through Massive Resistance, the southern states rejected
Brown Irs offer of compromise and cooperation. However, faced with school
closings and social turmoil, southern citizens themselves began to spurn that
rejection. Part VI also outlines how support for Brown emerged on the national
level, prompting the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.27 By attaching a cost to southern recalcitrance, these two
Acts changed outcomes: ultimately, the promise of Brown was able to proceed
in the context of federalism because the states were given financial and political
incentive to cooperate.
24. Interposition is the political theory that a state may nullify a federal law by "interposing" itself between
the federal government and the people whenever the state determines that the federal government has exercised
power not specifically delegated to it. See DREW McCoY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADtSON & THE
REPUBLICAN LEGACY 131-32 (1989). The theory of interposition was developed by Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison in the late 1790s in response to the Alien and Sedition Acts and elaborated by John C. Calhoun in the
1830s in response to the Tariff Act of 1828. See id (comparing Madison's and Calhoun's efforts at and theories
of nullification). As Tushnet explains:
Interposition was a "states' rights" constitutional theory. [T]he theory of interposition held that
the Constitution was created by the states as entities, not by individual American citizens. As
a result, the theory contended, each state's legal authority was as great as the national
government's. If a state disagreed on constitutional grounds with the national government, it
could "interpose" its sovereign power between the national government and its people, thereby
effectively nullifying the national action.
TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 240.
25. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000h-6 (1964).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1971-1973p (1965).
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II. PRE-BROWN CASELAW
After the Compromise of 1877,' marking the end of Reconstruction, officials
in the federal government, including the Justices of the Supreme Court, generally
kept their distance from the southern states' handling of black civil rights.29
Before the New Deal, the Court permitted segregated schools under the "separate
but equal" doctrine,3° but refrained from insisting that the states actually provide
equal facilities.3' After the New Deal, the Court continued to permit segregated
facilities, but only on the condition that the facilities actually were equal. 32 This
new requirement involved an unprecedented federal intrusion into state
educational affairs. This shift was primarily due to President Roosevelt's
appointment of judicial activists who were responsive to the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People's (NAACP) equalization litigation
strategy.
33
A. Separate But Equal
In Plessy v. Ferguson,' the Court held that a state statute requiring
segregation on railway cars did not violate the Thirteenth 35 and Fourteenth
Amendments36 of the U.S. Constitution. The Court noted that laws requiring
28. In theory, the issue of federal supremacy was settled by the outcome of the Civil War. See ORFIELD,
supra note 12, at 6. The effort to break local discrimination culminated in a fundamental change to the
Constitutional structure as outlined in the Reconstruction Amendments. See id However, this change was only
made possible by the temporary exclusion of southern politicians from Congress. See id In the electoral crisis
following the election of 1876, the Republican Party abandoned the Reconstruction agenda in exchange for a
southern agreement to abandon the Democratic candidate-hence, the Compromise of 1877. See id The Supreme
Court completed the abandonment of the agenda by narrowly construing the laws and amendments of
Reconstruction. See id
29. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THEHISTORY OF BRoWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 65 (1975); see also MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN
ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH x (1987) ("By the
middle of the twentieth century federal nonintervention had become, with considerable assistance from the
Supreme Court, not merely government policy but constitutional dogma.").
30. See WILKINSON, supra note 17, at 17, 23. The term "separate but equal" originates from the Supreme
Court case Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
31. See KLUGER, supra note 29, at 134.
32. It is undisputed that the segregated facilities were not in fact equal. Education in the post-Civil War
South was clearly unequal: as late as World War I, not a single black high school was in operation in the entire
rural South; in 1920, less than one-sixth of black students were in grade five or higher, in 1930, the South spent
one-half of the national norm for education of its white students and one-eighth for its black students. See
ORPIELD, supra note 12, at 13. Because the federal Office of Education deferred to local practices, the result
was that federal money financed both educational segregation and unequal allocation of funds between black
and white schools. See id at 15.
33. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT
FOR THE CiVuL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 58-67 (1994).
34. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For an excellent discussion of the
Plessy decision, see CHARLES A. LoPcREN, THE PLuSSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION (1987).
35. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51.
36. See id. at 542.
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separation of the races (e.g., laws establishing racially segregated schools) were
generally within the competency of the state legislatures as an exercise of state
police power.37
Three years later, the Court addressed for the first time, a case involving
separate schools for white and black children. 8 In Richmond County, Georgia,
the board of education, pursuant to the Georgia Constitution, maintained separate
high schools for white and black children.39 The board found that there were
too many black grade school children for the existing buildings and resolved the
dilemma by turning the black high school into a grade school.' This left black
high school students with no school to attend.41 Parents of the black high school
students sought to enjoin the operation of the white high school until the black
students were provided with equal facilities.42 In Cumming v. Richmond County
Board of Education,43 the Court upheld the decision of the school board and
denied the plaintiffs relief." Justice Harlan, writing for a unanimous court, held:
[The education of the people in schools maintained by state taxation is a
matter belonging to the respective states, and any interference on the part of
Federal authority with the management of such schools cannot be justified
except in the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by
the supreme law of the land.45
The Fourteenth Amendment notwithstanding, the Court, applying a dual system of
government principles, viewed public education as a matter reserved to the states.'
A decade later, the Court considered state authority to segregate private schools.
Berea College, a private institution incorporated under the laws of Kentucky, was
found to have violated a state statute making it unlawful for black and white
students to attend classes together.47 In Berea College v. Kentucky,48 the Court
upheld the state law as applied to the private institution "as coming within the power
of a state over its own corporate creatures" and therefore found that it did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment.49 Again, the Court deferred to the states.
37. See id at 544. The issue for the Plessy Court was whether the exercise of the state's police power was
"reasonable." See id at 550. The Court held that "[ifn determining the question of reasonableness [the state]
is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the people." Id
38. See Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
39. See id at 530.
40. See id at 532.
41. See id at 530.
42. See id at 531.
43. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
44. See id
45. Idt at 545. Justice Harlan noted that it was contended during oral arguments "that the vice in the
common-school system of Georgia was the requirement that the white and colored children of the state be
educated in separate schools." Id at 543. However, because that direct attack on segregation itself was not in
the pleadings, the Court did not consider the issue. See id.
46. See id at 545.
47. See Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908).
48. 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
49. See id at 58. Justice Harlan dissented: "Mhe statute is an arbitrary invasion of the rights of liberty
and property guaranteed by the 14th Amendment against hostile state action, and is, therefore, void .... [N]o
government, whether Federal or state, can legally forbid [the races] coming together." Id at 67-68. However,
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The Court once again addressed the issue of segregation and education in Gong
Lum v. Rice,50 where an American of Chinese ancestry fought for his daughter's
right to attend a white school in Mississippi.5' The school board prohibited the
plaintiff's child from attending a white school because the child was not
"white. '52 Instead, the child was told by the school board to attend a "colored"
school, 53 pursuant to a Mississippi constitutional provision requiring that
"[s]eparate schools ... be maintained for children of the white and colored
races."' The Court held that Mississippi did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause by providing a separate school for non-white children.55 Referring to
Cumming, the Court reiterated that "[t]he right and power of the state to regulate
the method of providing for the education of its youth at public expense is
clear., 56 Whether the issue be white/black or white/Chinese, "the decision is
within the discretion of the state in regulating its public schools, and does not
conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.
57
B. The New Deal
In 1930, the NAACP began its attack on segregation in education through
systematic litigation aimed at the actual inequality of segregated facilities.58 In
Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada,59 the Court's first segregation/public
education decision after the 1937 "switch in time,"'  the Court held that
Missouri violated the Fourteenth Amendment by operating a law school for white
students but none for black students.61 Gaines had been denied admission to the
University of Missouri Law School pursuant to the constitution, laws, and public
policy of Missouri and had been offered instead a Missouri scholarship to attend
Justice Harlan noted that "what I have said has no reference to regulations prescribed for public schools,
established at the pleasure of the state and maintained at the public expense." I at 69.
50. 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
51. See id at 81.
52. See id at 80.
53. See id at 81.
54. i at 82.
55. See id at 87.
56. Id at 85. The Court explained that this was not a new quesion--"it is the same question which has
been many times decided to be within the constitutional power of the state Legislatures to settle, without
intervention of the federal courts under the federal Constitution." Id at 86.
57. Id at 87.
58. See ANDREw Kuu, TiE COLOR-BLIND CoNsTTLON 141 (1992). In the early 1930s, it seemed a
fool's errand to challenge school segregation itself. See KLUGER, supra note 29, at 169. Howard University's
Journal of Negro Education noted in 1935 that "[s]chool segregation... had been the subject of litigation 113
times in twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia. Forty-four of the cases raised the question directly:
were segregated schools constitutional?' Id Each time the answer was an unswerving "yes." See id.
59. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
60. "Switch in time" refers to the abrupt change in decision-making by the Court in 1937. Prior to 1937,
the Court had struck down New Deal legislation as violative of the Tenth Amendment See WILIAM E.
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITLUIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT 216-36 (1995). However, "[bleginning in 1937, the Supreme Court upheld every New Deal statute
that came before it." id at 220.
61. See Gaines, 305 U.S. at 349-50.
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an out-of-state law school. 2 The Court found that providing a legal education
for a black Missouri resident in another state did not satisfy the Equal Protection
Clause:
It is an obligation the burden of which cannot be cast by one State upon
another, and no State can be excused from performance by what another State
may do or fail to do. That separate responsibility of each State within its own
sphere is of the essence of statehood maintained under our dual system.63
Thus, Gaines was entitled to attend Missouri's state university law school." By
rejecting Missouri's proposed solution because of its effects on other states, the
Court utilized federalism to advance black rights in the educational context for the
first time. 5
I. BROWN AND FEDERALISM
Pursuant to federalism concerns, the Court in Plessy, Cumming, and Gong Lum
approved the states' premise that "separate but equal" facilities satisfied the
Fourteenth Amendment and left to the states the responsibility to insure that
facilities actually were equal. The Court deferred to the states on both the ends
and the means of equal protection. After the New Deal, the Court began to
question the means-were the states actually providing equal, although separate,
facilities-but allowed the states to continue to select the end, segregated
facilities.
In Gaines and other pre-Brown education equalization cases, the Court, while
ostensibly allowing states to segregate, announced its intention to scrutinize the
states' efforts to satisfy the "separate but equal" doctrine.6 In these pre-Brown
cases, the Court had to grapple with educational minutia-how many children
should be in a classroom, what should teachers be paid, and other issues outside
of the Court's area of expertise.67 In contrast, in Brown the Court reversed the
62. See id. at 342-44.
63. 1& at 350. In the 1930s, in an effort to deflect black admittance into white colleges under the "separate
but equal" doctrine, the Maryland, Missouri, and Virginia legislatures allocated funds for out-of-state
scholarships. See KLUGER, supra note 29, at 313.
64. See Gaines, 305 U.S. at 352. "[P]etitioner was entitled to be admitted to the law school of the State
University in the absence of other and proper provision for his legal training within the State." I& By "other and
proper provision," the Gaines Court was referring to "a law department for negroes" at Missouri's state
university. See ii. at 351. After Gaines and before Brown, the Court heard three other graduate school
equalization cases in which the Court found inequality in the specific benefits enjoyed by white and black
students. See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948). The Court did not find
it necessary to re-examine the Plessy doctrine in order to decide these cases. See McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 637-41;
Sweat. 339 U.S. at 635-36; Sipuel, 332 U.S. at 631-33.
65. Justices McReynolds and Butler-the last of the four Justices who had opposed the New Deal on
federalism grounds (the "Four Horsemen"), see LEucHTENBuRG, supra note 60, at 132-33--dissented. See
Gaines, 305 U.S. at 353, 354 (McReynolds & Butler, JJ., dissenting). Justices McReynolds and Butler argued
in their dissenting opinion, citing Cumming and Gong Lum, that federal authority was interfering with a state
matter and that "[t]he State should not be unduly hampered through theorization inadequately restrained by
experience." Id at 354 (McReynolds & Butler, JJ.. dissenting).
66. See KLUGER, supra note 29, at 169-70.
67. See id
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roles-the Court would provide the general constitutional rule, but the states
would provide the details of implementation." The latter, Brown arrangement
was a wise choice because it was better suited to our federal form of
government-the federal government is more competent to establish general,
uniform rules, while local governments are better able to manage differences and
details.
A. Brown-The Constitutional Decision
In 1952, the Court agreed to hear a direct challenge to segregated public
education.69 The impact of the Court's decision would be enormous. At that
time, seventeen states required the segregation of public schools, four other states
permitted it, and in the District of Columbia, the custom of segregated schools
had been in existence for nearly ninety years. 70
In 1951, Governor James Byrnes of South Carolina, a former Supreme Court
Justice,7' announced, even before the lower court's decision, that if segregated
schools were declared unconstitutional, he would close the schools and privatize
the system.72 The citizens of South Carolina passed by referendum a measure
which gave the state legislature standby power to shut down the schools."'
Thus, as the Justices listened to the oral arguments and deliberated on the case,
they realized that more than a constitutional doctrine was at stake.74
During the first round of oral argument in Brown, future Supreme Court Justice
Thurgood Marshall, representing the NAACP, argued that school segregation was
a matter of state legislative policy which ran counter to the central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment-protecting the rights of blacks from state usurpation."
John Davis, representing South Carolina, relied on the Court's precedent and
emphasized that the right of a state to classify its public-school pupils by race was
not constrained by the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 Indeed, counsel for Virginia
68. See infra Part I.D.
69. See KLUGER, supra note 29, at 169-70.
70. See id at 327. At the time Brown was decided, 11,173 school districts, covering 11.5 million school-
age children, had segregated public school systems. See id
71. Byrnes had spent many years in the national government: as a Representative, a Senator, a Supreme
Court Justice, and as Secretary of State. See NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE
AND PoLmCS IN TmE SOuTH DURING THE 1950s 44 (1969). However, disturbed by President Truman's support
of civil rights and by the increasing centralization of power in the federal government, Byrnes broke with the
federal government and returned to state politics. See id. at 46.
72. See KLUGER, supra note 29, at 523.
73. See id.
74. To paraphrase President Grover Cleveland, the Court faced, not a theory, but a condition. See United
States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2290 (1996) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring) ("In the words of Grover
Cleveland's second inaugural address, the State faced a condition, not a theory.") The Justices also knew that
if they determined that the federal government should prohibit segregated schools, it would have to be the Court
which enacted the prohibition. "At the time Brown was argued and reargued, only one thing was clear. such
a mass movement [to overcome massive Southern congressional resistance to new civil rights legislation] did
not exist." BRUCE ACKERmAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOuNDATIONS 135 (1991).
75. See KLUGER, supra note 29, at 570.
76. See id. at 572-73. In his closing argument, Davis asked: "Is it not a fact that the very strength and fiber
of our federal system is local self-government in those matters for which local action is competent?' Id at 574.
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argued that Congress itself could not pass legislation desegregating public schools
pursuant to its enforcement powers because the Fourteenth Amendment had not
been intended to cover purely local matters such as schools-instead, a
constitutional amendment would be required."
On May 17, 1954, the Court announced its decision in Brown, holding that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the states from
maintaining racially segregated public schools.78 When Brown was first argued,
according to the various tabulations from the Justices' papers, it was a close
vote.79 The Justices were loathe to jettison traditional constitutional constraints,
including principles of federalism, and were hesitant to become a national school
board for the country.'
None of these concerns, or the rationale that assuaged these concerns, was
expressed in the unanimous opinion itself. Brown held that the Plessy doctrine
of "separate but equal" was inapplicable to public schools."' The Court found
the "effect of segregation itself on public education" to be "detrimental,"8'2 but
did not explain why the Court was entitled to make this examination. The Court
was plainly second-guessing the states in this area, something the Court had
refused to do in Plessy, Gong Lum, and Cumming.8 3 The Court did not address
the federalism concerns of these prior cases." While discussing the historical
evolution in public education and noting that great changes had taken place since
Reconstruction, Chief Justice Warren concluded that education had become
"perhaps the most important function of state and local governments" in addition
to "the very foundation of good citizenship."8 5  However, the Court failed to
77. See id at 576-77.
78. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
79. See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REv. 747, 816
(1991).
80. In his papers, Justice Reed noted that the "states should be left to work out the problem for themselves";
similarly, Justice Clark wrote "we had led the states on to think segregation is OK and we should let them work
it out." See id at 817 n.308.
The Court's hesitancy to get involved in education matters was not confined to the racial context. In a post-
New Deal decision, the Court upheld, against a First Amendment challenge, a state law that required all
schoolchildren to pledge allegiance to the American flag. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
598 (1940). Speaking for the Court, Justice Frankfurter noted that for the Justices to pass on state and local
flag-salute regulations "would in effect make us the school board for the country." Id Justice Stone dissented.
See id at 601 (Stone, J., dissenting). A few years later, in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that school children could not be required to join in a flag salute ceremony), a majority
of the Court agreed with Justice Stone and overturned the law at issue.
81. See Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495.
82. Id at 492.
83. See discussion of Plessy, Gong Lan, and Cumming supra Part U.A.
84. It appears that the decision to side-step these concerns was a conscious one--4he goal for the Justices
was consensus, not precision of legal analysis. See Amaker, supra note 11. at 12 ("Mhe practical necessity of
writing an opinion in which all the justices could join argued against saying more than it did."). The Justices
were divided over whether segregation had been unconstitutional all along. See KLUGER., supra note 29, at 613.
Further, Justice Jackson did not want the Court's opinion to appear accusatory. See id at 609. Thus, in the
interests of being politic, the Justices probably thought it best not to highlight the divisive issue of federalism
or that the states could not be trusted to protect minority rights.
85. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493.
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note that it was not just the assumptions of the social sciences and the role of
public education that had changed since Plessy;6 the role of the federal govern-
ment, including the federal courts, had changed since Plessy as well.'
B. Critique of Brown
Brown was poorly written from a theoretical, federalist point of view."' While
it seems obvious today that the Fourteenth Amendment allows the Court to scru-
tinize all state racial classifications, in the decades following ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Court generally confined federal protection against state
infringement to a limited sphere of economic rights.8 9 Additionally, as Plessy,
Cumming, Berea, and Gong Lum indicate,' the Court immunized education from
federal interference. In Brown, the Court did not hold that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibited the states from making racial classifications altogether-a judicial
path alluded to over seventy years earlier in Strauder v. West Virginia9l-nor did
the Court refer to the famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products
Co.,' which would have provided justification for the Court's intervention.93
86. See KLUGER, supra note 29, at 524.
87. See id
88. Of course, the Court was in a no-win situation. If it had spelled out for the states that the federal
government had grown more powerful and that the states had proved themselves to be incapable of protecting
minority rights, the states would have been incensed, thus spoiling the spirit of cooperation that the Court was
trying to engender in order to enforce Brown.
89. See KLUGER, supra note 29, at 56 (Ironically, the Fourteenth Amendment. "that had been designed to
assure the Negro of his civil rights, would come to be called upon far more often as a license to corporations
and other businesses seeking to avoid government regulation."). See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTmTION IN THE SUPREME COURT. TIR SEcOND CENTURY. 1888-1986 7-54 (1990).
90. See discussion of Plessy, Cumming, Berea, and Gong L.wn supra Part ll.A.
91. 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (holding that the exclusion of blacks from juries violated the Fourteenth
Amendment).
92. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Footnote four reads:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as
those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,
is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. [The Court then listed cases
concerning: restrictions upon the right to vote; restraints upon the dissemination of
information; interferences with political organizations; and prohibition of peaceful assembly].
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious or national or racial minorities; whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id at 152 n.4 (citations omitted).
93. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1985). Ackerman
explains:
Assume, for example, that the people of a state, after excluding blacks from the polls,
elect an all-white legislature that proceeds to enact some classic Jim Crow legislation. Under
the Carolene approach, the court does not purport to challenge the substantive value
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Bruce Ackerman suggests that a justification for federal intervention was not
required because Brown was a post-New Deal decision.94 Ackerman's "interpretive
hypothesis" is that "the New Deal's affirmation of activist government undercut
Plessy just as surely as the Reconstruction's affirmation of national citizenship
undercut Dred Scott."95 Yet, Ackerman concedes that Chief Justice Warren, when
noting that times had changed since Plessy was decided, "does not make this point
... by reflecting directly upon the meaning of the New Deal's legitimation of
activist government."
Although the New Deal greatly expanded the national government's role into
many areas of American life, the New Deal "did nothing to diminish the preference
for local control of education." 97  Because public education was perhaps the
quintessential function of local government, it is odd that the Court did not attempt
to establish a national interest in education to bolster its opinion. As a policy matter,
after noting that public schools were an essential precondition for citizenship, the
Court should have emphasized that students were both state and national citizens,
9
judgments underlying the legislative decisions; instead, it simply denies that the Jim Crow
statute would have emerged from a fair and open political process in which blacks were
allowed to participate.
Id at 715.
94. See ACKERMAN, supra note 74, at 145-50.
95. Id at 145 (citing Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)). In Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice
Brown stated that the Fourteenth Amendment "could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon
color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality." 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896), overruled by
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1). "Once the New Deal Court had authorized the
state's power to guarantee a retirement pension or a minimum wage, Justice Brown's confident distinction
between social and political equality was no longer tenable." ACKERMAN, supra note 74, at 146.
96. ACKERMAN, supra note 74, at 149. According to Kull, the history of the judicial role in ending racial
segregation, from Plessy to Brown, "is less a story of evolving constitutional doctrine than a story of evolving
judicial power." KULL, supra note 58, at 131. As Akhil Amar notes:
Brown, after all, only revived the Reconstruction amendments; it did not invent them.
Even if one were to look only at case law, the seeds of Brown were evident throughout the
period from 1938 to 1954 in the burgeoning doctrine of selective incorporation and in a
dramatic series of civil rights cases orchestrated by the [National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)].
Akhil R. Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 706 (1989) (book review).
97. ORFLD, supra note 12, at 48.
Although the national government began granting public lands to support local schools
even before the Constitution was adopted, the financing of education is still the most
important local responsibility. The great leaders of the movement to create public school
systems had been local and state rather than national figures .... This arrangement was
nicely consonant with the prevailing constitutional theory of the day, with its emphasis on
states' rights and limited Federal authority. By the late 1800s, the idea of state control of the
school curriculum was the American way. Any suggestion of change aroused the abiding
public suspicion of strong central government.
Id at 309.
98. See Patrick J. Kelley, An Alternative Originalist Opinion for Brown v. Board of Education, 20 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 75. 89 (1995), for an interesting attempt to rewrite this section of Brown:
It could be argued that, as we have become an information-based, technology-driven
society, a basic education has become part of the limited set of basic rights protected under
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Since one cannot, without a basic education,
successfully enjoy and defend life and liberty, or acquire, possess, and protect property and
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and thus, the federal government, beyond the explicit applicability of the Equal
Protection Clause to the states, had a legitimate interest in the education of
children."
This lapse in rationale for the federal "encroachment" into a "protected" (by case
precedent) state area did not go unnoticed. It was, as shown below, the subject of
the Southern Manifesto, the state interposition resolutions, and Massive Resistance.
The federalism critique of Brown that bolstered Massive Resistance has been
summarized by segregationist Peter A. Carmichael. 1" Carmichael did not view
Brown as a vindication of individual rights guaranteed by the federal government
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.1 ' From Carmichael's (and the southern
states') point of view, Brown broadened the federal government's authority, invaded
the rights of states, and branded unconstitutional a local practice that had been in
place for generations.' 2 Carmichael further argued that Plessy recognized that the
power to racially segregate was part of the states' police power and therefore was
reserved to the states and the people under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.'0 3
Carmichael noted that prior to Brown, the Supreme Court had deferred to state
legislation under the Plessy "separate but equal" doctrine, and yet, in Brown the
Court reversed its policy of deference without explanation."°4
C. Brown H-The Implementation Decision
Though Brown invalidated institutionalized segregation in the public schools in
1954, the Court ordered further arguments and briefing on the issue of
implementation.'15 Although the southern states submitted separate briefs, they
reputation, it follows that a basic education has become a basic, inherent right that cannot be
provided by the state in a way that discriminates against blacks. The principle of limited
absolute equality in fundamental natural rights, embodied in the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, would prohibit discrimination in the state's provision of basic education.
I&
99. The Court is still struggling with federalism and education. Compare United States v. Lopez. 115 S.
Ct. 1624, 1640 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[Elducation is a traditional concern of the States."), with
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The welfare of our future 'Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States' is vitally dependent on the character of the education of our children.") (citations
omitted), and Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Education ... has long been inextricably
intertwined with the Nation's economy.").
100. Peter A. Carmichael, a professor of philosophy at Louisiana State University, attempted to portray the
"South's side" in his book THE SouTH AND SEGREGATION (1965). While Carmichael criticized Brown on a
number of grounds, from the alleged violation of the Thirteenth Amendment rights of white students to the
"psycho-sociological" basis of the opinion, many of his arguments were rooted in federalism. See CARMICHAEL,
supra, at 32-75.
101. See id.
102. See id
103. See id at 40.
104. See id at 47. Again, the explanation was not stated because the Court, in its effort to gain cooperation
from the southern states, did not want to spell out that federal deference to state authority had been abused by
the states, resulting in the states' failure to protect minority rights. See supra note 88.
105. South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, Kansas, and the District of Columbia were already involved in the
litigation, but all states affected by the decision were permitted to submit briefs and participate in the arguments.
See KLUGER, supra note 29, at 723-25. Arkansas, Florida, Maryland, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas
joined the United States as amici curiae. See id. at 724.
Winter 1997]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
generally agreed in their request for the least specific and most indirect
implementation decree possible.' 6 In contrast, lawyers for the NAACP asked for
a specific decree with a definite time limit to insure an immediate remedy to the
constitutional wrong." The United States' position was closer to that of the
southern states, asking for a flexible remedy." The Supreme Court adopted the
substance of the southern states' position.'0 9
In Brown I,110 the Court noted that since "these cases arose under different
local conditions and their disposition will involve a variety of local problems," the
implementation of Brown "may require solution of varied local problems.""' The
Court further emphasized that "[sichool authorities have the primary responsibility
for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems.""' Due to the local nature
of both the problem and the requisite solutions, the Court declined to chaperon the
school authorities, delegating that duty to the local district courts "[b]ecause of their
proximity to local conditions.""' 3 The Court's only direction to the district courts
was that they "be guided by equitable principles ... characterized by a practical
flexibility" and that Brown be implemented "with all deliberate speed," listing
potential problems that courts could consider in determining appropriate timetables
for desegregation." 4 The Court warned that "the vitality of [the constitutional
principles set forth in Brown] cannot be allowed to yield simply because of
disagreement with them,""' 5 without citing the Supremacy Clause or any other
authority that the Court would later find necessary to cite in Cooper v. Aaron."6
D. Critique of Brown II
Both at the time of the decision and in subsequent appraisals, Brown II was
criticized for delegating too much authority to the district courts and relying unduly
on state and local authorities. For example, Derrick Bell has accused the Court of
failing to follow up on the desegregation "promise," noting that the Court
condoned the application of procedural requirements and pupil placement laws
which it knew were designed to delay or evade substantial compliance with the
principles enunciated in Brown I. For eight years after its implementation
decision [Brown I], the Court refused to review any case in which questions
106. See id. at 723-31.
107. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 59.
108. See idi
109. See i.
110. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
111. I& at 298-99.
112. Md at 299.
113. Id
114. See i& at 300-01. After the Brown 11 decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren explained his use of the
phrase "all deliberate speed," reflecting the federalism concerns of the Court: "[B]ecause we realized that under
our federal system there were so many blocks preventing an immediate solution of the thing in reality that the
best we could look for would be a progression of action-and to keep it going, in a proper manner, we adopted
that phrase." KLUGER, supra note 29, at 744 (quoting Chief Justice Earl Warren).
115. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300 (quoting Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)). See discussion of Cooper
infra Part V.C.
116. 358 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
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were raised concerning the validity of pupil placement regulations or the
appropriateness of applying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies to frustrate suits seeking to vindicate the right to a desegregated
education.1
17
Federalism-the distribution of power between the national government and the
states-may be viewed normatively and descriptively: how should you distribute
power and how do you distribute power. 8 It is in the latter context that the
criticism of Brown II (that the Court gave too much power to the states) must be
weighed. Critics of Brown II tend to focus solely on how the Court should have
distributed power to protect a federal right, disregarding the more important issue
of how that distribution of power can occur. Criticism of the Brown II decision
ignores that the Court needed the states to implement Brown."9 The Supreme
Court possessed no enforcement machinery and lacked effective support from both
the executive and the legislative branches.
Beyond having the power to eliminate public education altogether, as Governor
Byrnes had threatened in 1951,12 the state and local authorities possessed the
expertise pertinent to education-not the federal government, and least of all the
federal courts. Donald H. Regan believes that in the context of federalism and
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the proper question should be: "Is there some
reason the federal government must be able to do this, some reason why we cannot
leave the matter to the states?" '  Regan argues that the Reconstruction
Amendments differ from the Commerce Clause: with the Commerce Clause, state
competency is the question; with the Reconstruction Amendments, state competency
is irrelevant."n In the context of education, however, federal competency is a
relevant question.
117. DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw 458 (1973); see WILKINSON, supra note
17, at 61-62 ("[From 1955 to 1968, the Court abandoned the field of public school desegregation. Its
pronouncements were few, given the proportions of the problem. And its leadership was almost nonexistent.").
Writing in 1961, J.W. Peltason also argued that the Court made a "serious mistake" by delegating too much
discretion to the district courts and local authorities. See J. W. PELTASON, FrfrY-EIGHT LONELY MEN:
SourTERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 245 (1961).
118. See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485. 1487-90 (1994).
119. As Hamilton pointed out, the judiciary has "neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments." THE FEDERAUST
No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
120. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 60-61.
121. See KLUGER, supra note 29, at 523.
122. Donald H. Regan, How To Think About The Federal Commerce Power, and Incidentally Rewrite United
States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 555 (1995).
123. See id at 594. As Regan explains:
Mhe Reconstruction Amendments make specific policy choices, which Congress is
authorized, and indeed obligated in conscience, to use its enforcement powers to promote.
Even if the states could make their individual decisions about whether to engage in race
discrimination, for example, fully effective, Congress would not thereby be deprived of
grounds for intervention. So we should not think about the scope of the enforcement powers
the same way we think about the scope of the commerce power.
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Although a federal right was involved in Brown l-the right to equal protection
of the laws-this right was implicated in an area of traditional state
authority-education. As a result, Brown I was an experiment in cooperative
federalism.1" The Court relied principally on two resources to make the experiment
work: local federal judges and the Court's ability to compromise with the southern
states."n In a sense, these two resources were the carrots offered to the states to
forge cooperation.
Implementation was entrusted to the federal district judges-men born and
educated in the South, active in the community and political life of their states, and
who owed their appointment to the bench to the endorsement of the states' leading
politicians." The potential of this phenomena did not go unnoticed. As one
Mississippi attorney stated, Brown Hwas a "very definite victory for the South. We
couldn't ask for anything better than to have our local, native Mississippi federal
district judges consider suits .... Our local judges know the local situation and it
may be 100 years before it's feasible." 1"
The Federalist Papers did not envision the local federal judge as a structural
protector of federalism."n In arguing for federal district courts-as opposed to
reliance on state courts-Hamilton argued that "the prevalency of a local spirit may
be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the jurisdiction of national causes"; that
state judges "will be too little independent to be relied upon for an inflexible
execution of the national laws."1' 9 Hamilton, perhaps blinded by his ardent
nationalism, failed to focus on the hybrid nature of the federal district judge-a
federal official who must live in the community on which he passed judgment."
124. For a description of cooperative federalism, see supra note 16. To the extent that Brown II failed, it
highlights the pitfalls of having the judiciary allocate power between federal and local governments. See Kramer,
supra note 118, at 1500 ("Judges lack the resources and institutional capacity to gather and evaluate the data
needed for [power allocation] decisions. They also lack the democratic pedigree to legitimize what they do if
it turns out to be controversial. But most of all, courts lack the flexibility to change or modify their course
easily ... ").
125. See generally BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 58-66.
126. See generally id. at 65.
127. ORPIELD, supra note 12, at 16 (quoting REED SARRATT, THE ORDEAL OF SEGREGATION 200 (1966)
(alteration in original)), see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, TlE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRiNG ABOUT SOCtAL
CHANGE 89 (1991). According to Rosenberg:
The awareness of the power of discretion, and the use to which some judges would put it, led
Southern segregationists to fight to vest control of civil rights in lower-court judges. Arguing
for South Carolina in Brown 11, S. E. Rogers asked for district court control, admitting in
response to questions that this would result in no desegregation, "perhaps not until 2015 or
2045."
Id (quoting S.E. Rogers) (citation omitted); see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW
153 (1966) (The Lieutenant Governor of Georgia, Ernest Vandiver, rejoiced: "fIhey are steeped in the same
tradition that I am .... A 'reasonable time' can be construed as one year or two hundred. ... Thank God
we've got good Federal judges.").
128. See THE FEDERAuST No. 81, at 486 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
129. Id
130. See ROSENBERG, supra note 127, at 89-90 ("Lower-court judges routinely upheld statutes designed to
evade compliance with Supreme Court mandates .... The tools of abuse of discretion-delay, and narrow
interpretation (or purposeful misinterpretation)-can be effectively harnessed by biased judges. Unfortunately,
throughout the South there were many biased judges."). However, there were a number of "unbiased,"
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This phenomena is enhanced by the political custom of allowing U.S. Senators to
nominate judges for the district courts in their state and by "senatorial courtesy," the
practice of deference to Senators' judgments about the merits of appointees from
their own states.
131
Thurgood Marshall had urged the Brown IICourt not to accept delay in its imple-
mentation decision. 132 Marshall argued that the southern states were asking for
time in order to devise ways to circumvent Brown, not to figure out how best and
faithfully to obey it.133  However accurate Marshall's prediction was, given our
federalist system and that Brown lwas prior to the Court being confronted with the
reality of Massive Resistance, the Court was properly wary of accepting such a
presumption of bad faith on the part of the states.
More importantly, by inviting the non-party southern states to join Brown II,
adopting their suggestions for implementation, and delegating authority to local
federal judges, the Court was playing broker politics. In a sense, the Court was
saying: "If you accept our general premise, we'll let you create the rules." While
the Court could have ignored the interests of the southern states, given that the
position as Justice is life-tenured, and issued an opinion that looked beyond them
to the higher public good, such an opinion would probably have been worthless and
only served to undermine the Court's credibility.' I 4 The Court attempted to enlist
compromise-long an instrument of subjugation of black Americansl 3 5-in the
services of racial progress.
IV. MASSIVE RESISTANCE
Because of the events that followed Brown II, it is impossible to determine
whether the Court's strategy for cooperative federalism would have worked.
courageous federal judges who, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, became heroes in the desegregation story.
See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981).
131. See Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CoNFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 36, 38
(1985); see also ROSENBERG, supra note 127, at 18 ("ITihe judicial selection process for lower federal court
judges is designed to select people who reflect the mores and beliefs of the community in which the court sits."
(citation omitted)).
132. See KLUOER, supra note 29, at 730.
133. See id
134. Herbert Brownell, President Eisenhower's Attorney General, speculates that the Court rejected the
NAACP demand for immediate desegregation and opted for a "gradual approach" because it "might make it
unnecessary to have the federal government send large numbers of federal officials ('carpeibaggers' as they had
been called during the Reconstruction era) to supersede local school officials." Herbert Brownell, Civil Rights
in the 1950s, 69 TUL. L. REV. 781, 786 (1995).
135. See WILKINSON, supra note 17, at 7-8. Wilkinson states:
Compromise had largely been the by-word since the original Constitution declared that three-
fifths of the slaves, discreetly called "all other Persons" to distinguish them from "free
Persons," should count in apportioning representatives to the states. The nineteenth century
was the century of national compromise over the Negro: the Missouri Compromise, the
Compromise of 1850, the Compromise of 1877, and, of course, when compromise broke
down, the Civil War. Nor did compromise end with the 1800s. Most American presidents
of the present century-the two Roosevelts, Wilson, Eisenhower, and Nixon among
them--saw each wave of zeal for racial justice compromised against the need for day to day
southern political support.
1,. (citation omitted).
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President Eisenhower's and Congress's failure to support the Court's decision in
Brown II caused Brown IF s implicit promise of federal intervention if the states did
not cooperate to wither to an empty threat. Accordingly, absence of support from
the executive and legislative branches of the federal government undermined the
Court's ability to pursue its experiment in cooperative federalism. Because the threat
of federal enforcement was no longer credible, the states had nothing to lose by not
cooperating with the Court's decision to integrate public schools!"
"Ironically, the immediate reaction to Brown was relatively mild... ." 37 After
Brown was issued, a New York Times survey of southern school officials revealed
that the prevailing mood was that "desegregation would proceed peacefully, if
painfully."1 3 However, during this period, racial extremists began to form White
Citizens' Councils as an organized effort to defy the Court's desegregation opinions
by waging campaigns of terror against black citizens. 39 Unfortunately, a political
leadership vacuum developed-local, state, and federal officials were unwilling to
endorse Brown, or at least to prepare their citizens for implementation of the Court's
wishes.Y Into this vacuum stepped "the regional leader[s] who perceived political
capital in opposing the decision ... .,4I These leaders declined the Court's
136. As a segregationist critic of Brown points out:
If Washington can compel a state to have schools or any certain school, then the state is
practically stripped of sovereignty and reduced to the level of a minion of the Federal
Government. Why should it then act at all-why not close down, leaving all to Washington?
Of course Washington is not prepared for that; and the extent to which it is not prepared is
a measure of the extent to which the Supreme Court has overreached itself ....
CARMICHAEL, supra note 100, at 239 n.4.
137. DAVID R. GOLDPIELD, BLACK, WHrrE, AND SoUTHERN: RACERELA1ONS AND SouTHERNCULTtRE 1940
TO THE PRESENT 75 (1990). It is important to note that it was during this calm before the storm that the Court
initiated its experiment in federalism in Brown II. As the Court pointed out in Brown 11, during the period between
Brown and Brown II, "substantial steps to eliminate racial discrimination in public schools have already been taken
...." Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,299 (1955) (Brown 17). During the 1954-1957 period a "total of 750
school districts underwent at least token desegregation, almost all of them voluntarily." See KLUGER, supra note
29, at 754. For example, three days after Brown, the Litte Rock District School Board adopted and made public
the following statement: "It is our responsibility to comply with Federal Constitutional Requirements and we intend
to do so when the Supreme Court of the United States outlines the method to be followed." Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, 7 (1958) (quoting the Little Rock District School Board's policy statement).
138. GouraELD, supra note 137, at 77. "By the 1956-57 school year, desegregation affecting three hundred
thousand black youngsters was underway in 723 school districts, mainly in the Upper South . i
Additionally, C. Vann Woodward states:
For a time after the decision of 17 May 1954, there appeared to be grounds for optimism.
The Court's precedent breaking opinion seemed to destroy all legal foundations for
segregation. Yet there were no sensational outbursts of defiance. The restrained tone of the
Southern press and Southern leaders was the subject of wide comment and congratulations.
WOODWARD, supra note 127, at 150.
139. See DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITCS OF RAGE: GEORGE WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW
CONSERVATiSM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION op AMERIcAN POLrncs 82-83 (1995). "Citizens' Councils silenced
the voice of moderate whites, coordinated the adoption of a wide range of state and local anti-integration
legislation, and forced southern politicians to back away from even the most tepid support of peaceful
compliance with the Supreme Court's decision." I&
140. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 137, at 78.
141. Id Historian C. Vann Woodward has noted that during the years following Brown, "[all over the South
the lights of reason and tolerance and moderation began to go out under the resistance demand for conformity."
WoODWARD, supra note 127, at 165.
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invitation to create the rules of desegregation, preferring to reject the Court's
premise altogether. 142 In opposition to Brown, these leaders enacted interposition
resolutions1 4 and mounted a campaign to form a third national political party, the
States' Rights Party.'" Although these efforts failed, states were able to prevent
enforcement of Brown through their influence in Congress and in the two pre-
existing national political parties. 45
A. President Eisenhower's Response to Brown
President Dwight Eisenhower privately condemned Brown as "morally
repugnant" and "politically confounding" and worried that the South would view it
as "a 'Republican' decision." 1 During a March 9, 1956 cabinet meeting, he
warned United States Attorney General Herbert Brownell-a civil rights
advocate--"not 'to take the attitude that you are another Sumner"' 47 and
contended that "[p]eople have a right to disagree with the Supreme Court decision
.... [After all] the Supreme Court has disagreed with its own decision of [sixty]
years standing."1" Three days later the Southern Manifesto was issued in
Congress. President Eisenhower "refused to comment... on any person's 'right to
confirm or not confirm' a [C]ourt decision."1 49 President Eisenhower did not
publicly support Brown and did not counter rumors that he opposed the Court's
decision."1 Eisenhower's use of troops in Little Rock, Arkansas during the fall of
1957 was the extent of his support of Brown.1 51 Eisenhower's refusal to take sides
in the debate concerning federal and state authority created a dangerous void. As
Justice Tom Clark later postulated: "If Mr. Eisenhower had come through ... it
would have changed things a lot.' 5 1
142. See discussion infra Part IV.B and IV.C.
143. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1. For an explanation of interposition, see supra note 24.
144. See discussion Infra Part IV.C.2.
145. See discussion infra Part IV.B and IV.C.
146. KENNETH O'REILLy, NIXON'S PIANO: PRESIDENTS AND RACIAL POLITICS FROM WASHINGTON TO
CLINTON 170 (1995). Indeed, President Eisenhower "promised Governor Byrnes [of South Carolina] that the
administration would not enforce school desegregation 'with all deliberate speed,' as required by [Brown II].
Instead the administration would 'make haste slowly."' Id
147. Id at 174 (quoting President Eisenhower). Presumably, President Eisenhower was referring to Charles
Sumner (1811-1874), nineteenth century anti-slavery leader and United States Senator known for his commitment
to civil rights and federal anti-discrimination legislation. See generally DAVID HERBERT DONALD, CHARLES
SUMNER (1996).
148. O'REBLLY, supra note 146, at 170 (quoting President Eisenhower) (omission in original).
149. Id at 175 (quoting President Eisenhower).
150. See ROSENBERG, supra note 127, at 76.
151. See ACKERMAN, supra note 74, at 109, see also ROSENBERG, supra note 127, at 75-76 ("[With the
exception of the Little Rock [C]risis, the president did not involve himself or the executive branch in efforts to
achieve compliance with court-ordered desegregation.").
152. KLUGER, supra note 29, at 753 (quoting Justice Tom Clark). According to Roy Wilkins, former
executive director of the NAACP, "if [President Eisenhower] had fought World War H the way he fought for
civil rights, we would all be speaking German today." ROSENBERG, supra note 127, at 76 (quoting ROY
WILKINS, STANDING FAST. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ROY WILKINS 222 (1984)).
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Michael Klarman questions the conventional attribution of President
Eisenhower's reticence to federalism principles. Klarman argues instead that
"Eisenhower had consciously embraced a 'southern strategy' in 1952, and it
worked" and noted that Eisenhower's "stunning refusal to publicly condemn the
Southern Manifesto in 1956 [was] a play for southern white votes." 153 Klarman
posits that Eisenhower intervened in Little Rock "only when backed to the wall"
because Eisenhower believed that Governor Faubus of Arkansas "had acted
duplicitously in personal dealings with the president, and, significantly, only after
the 1956 elections had safely passed. '""M
Klarman' s distrust of Eisenhower's purported dedication to federalism principles
must be weighed against the fact that immediately after Brown was decided,
President Eisenhower exercised his direct authority over the District of Columbia
and ordered desegregation of its public schools. 55 As Brownell points out in
defense of President Eisenhower, "no such presidential authority existed with regard
to the states."" Indeed, in his 1953 State of the Union address, President
Eisenhower committed the Office of the President to ending segregation in the
District of Columbia, in the federal government, and in the military.1 57 As a result,
President Eisenhower's actions can be explained as consistent with federalism
principles.
B. Southern Congressional Opposition to Brown
In the rhetoric of southern politicians-state and federal-the rights of states and
the rights of southern whites became inextricably intertwined. Senator Harry Byrd
of Virginia, who had opposed the New Deal, as well as President Truman's Fair
Deal, viewed Brown as an opportunity for the South to rededicate itself to state
sovereignty and create a united front-Massive Resistance-to halt the expansion
of federal power and reverse the trend toward "totalitarian government.
15 8
Shortly after Brown II, Senator James 0. Eastland told his constituents in
Mississippi that: "On May 17, 1954, the Constitution of the United States was
destroyed because the Supreme Court disregarded the law and decided that
integration was right. You are not required to obey any court which passes out such
153. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change & the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REv. 7, 132-33
(1994).
154. Id at 131-32.
155. See Brownell, supra note 134, at 786; see also TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA
IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 113 (1988) (On May 18, 1954, "President Eisenhower informed the District of
Columbia that he wanted the nation's capital to set an example of compliance with the law by desegregating
in advance of specific court orders.").
156. Id; see GOLDFIELD, supra note 137, at 78. Goldfield explains: "In Washington, though President
Eisenhower acted quickly in outlawing, by executive order, segregation in the District of Columbia's public
schools, he had serious reservations about either the advisability or legality of federal power over local school
boards." Id
157. See CHARLES 0. JONEs, THE PRESIDENCY IN A SEPARATED SYsTEM 252 (1994).
158. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 109 (citing Virginia Senator Harry Byrd's speeches of 1955 and 1956).
Although Senator Byrd originated the term "Massive Resistance" and was instrumental in its implementation
in Virginia, the Deep South remained the heart of Massive Resistance. See id at 117.
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a ruling. In fact, you are obligated to defy it."' 159  In May 1955, Eastland
demanded an investigation into the extent of communist subversive influence behind
Brown. The Court's reliance on social science, in particular the work of Gunnar
Myrdal,'" left it open to the allegation by Senator Eastland that the Court had
participated in "the worldwide Communist conspiracy .... ,,l6
The most visible form of Congressional political defiance was the Southern
Manifesto, signed in 1956 by all but two of the senators and representatives from the
southern states. 62 On March 12, 1956, the Southern Manifesto-formally titled
the "Declaration of Constitutional Principles"-was introduced in the Senate by
Senator Walter George of Georgia and in the House by Representative Howard W.
Smith of Virginia.' 63 The Southern Manifesto decried the Brown decision as "a
clear abuse ofjudicial power" because it undertook to "legislate, in derogation of the
authority of Congress, and to encroach upon the reserved rights of the States and the
people."1 The Southern Manifesto stated:
The original Constitution does not mention education. Neither does the
14th [A]mendment nor any other amendment. The debates preceding the
submission of the 14th [A]mendment clearly show that there was no intent that
it should affect the system of education maintained by the States ....
[The Supreme Court] unanimously declared in 1927 in [Gong] Lum v. Rice that
the "separate but equal" principle is "within the discretion of the State in
regulating its public schools and does not conflict with the [14th]
[A]mendment".... [T]here has been no constitutional amendment or act of
Congress changing this established legal principle almost a century old ....
We reaffirm our reliance on the Constitution as the fundamental law of the
land.
We decry the Supreme Court's encroachments on rights reserved to the
States and to the people, contrary to established law, and to the Constitution ....
159. BASS, supra note 130, at 17 (quoting Mississippi Senator James 0. Eastland).
160. Gunnar Myrdal is the author of the American race relations study cited by the Brown Court. See
generally Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 n. 11 (1954) (Brown 1) (citing GUNNAR MYRDAL,
AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944)). The accusations of
communist influence stem from the fact that Myrdal was a leader of Sweden's Social Democratic Party and an
architect of that country's socialist welfare state. See generally PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M.
STRATTON, JR., THE NEW COLOR LINE: How QUOTAS AND PRIVILEGE DESTROY DEMOCRACY 22 (1995).
161. BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 119-20. Jerry Falwell, then a young preacher in Lynchburg, Virginia,
proclaimed that "we see the hand of Moscow in the background" of the Brown litigation. See GOLDFJED, supra
note 137, at 76 (quoting Jerry Falwell).
162. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 116. Bickel refers to the Manifesto as a "calculated declaration of
political war against the Court's decision." ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLrrcs 256 (1962).
163. See Southern Manifesto, supra note 23, at 435.
164. Id at 435-37. The Southern Manifesto was originally conceived as an endorsement of interposition. See
BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 116. Several legislators, however, refused to sign the Southern Manifesto until
passages explicitly approving interposition and declaring Brown unconstitutional and illegal were deleted. See
iaL at 116-17.
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Even though we constitute a minority in the present Congress, we have
full faith that a majority of the American people believe in the dual system of
government which has enabled us to achieve our greatness and will in time
demand that the reserved rights of the States and of the people be made secure
against judicial usurpation. 165
The Southern Manifesto made resistance to the federal courts respectable across
the South and signaled that there would be no federal retribution for defiance of
Brown.166 As Rosenberg points out, the Southern Manifesto "demonstrated to all
that pressure from Washington to implement the Court's decisions in civil rights
would not be forthcoming." 67 This demonstration suggested that the Court's
compromise position in Brown II was not a credible one; state officials had nothing
to lose by refusing to desegregate. Furthermore, if the "best and brightest" of the
South-its federal representatives-felt compelled to denounce a coordinate branch
of government, surely the ordinary southern citizen could do no less.
The Southern Manifesto was not the only congressional threat to the Court's
authority. Brown and the Court's other decisions regarding defense of political
dissent, equal protection, and broadening federal authority had antagonizedpowerful
interest groups and created an anti-Court alliance in Congress.' This
congressional bloc, composed of southern Democrats and conservative Republicans,
backed legislation that did not directly refer to segregation, but attacked the
independence of the Court and challenged the philosophy of judicial activism
implicit in the Brown decision.169 These bills, which would have restricted the
Court's appellate jurisdiction, never passed. However, the final tally revealed a
close vote. 1'o
C. The States' Response to Brown
1. Interposition
It is ironic that, writing in 1952, Professor Louis Hartz made the following
prediction at the conclusion of his essay on nullification: "But it seems extremely
unlikely that in the twentieth century the delegates of any 'sovereign' state in the
Union will ever gather, as the South Carolina delegates gathered in the fall of 1832,
165. Southern Manifesto, supra note 23, at 435-36 (quoting Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 87 (1927)).
166. See ROSENBERG, supra note 127, at 78.
167. Id
168. See BARTI.EY, supra note 71, at 290-91.
169. See id The proposed legislation would have limited the federal courts' ability to declare that a federal
statute preempted a state law, reversed several Supreme Court rulings concerning anti-sedition laws, and deprived
the Court of jurisdiction over state regulation of subversive activities. See GREENBERG, supra note 33, at 213-
14; see also ROBERT MANN, THE WALLS OF JERICHO: LYNDON JOHNSON, HUBERT HUMPHREY, RiCHARD
RUSSELL, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ClViL RIGHTS 231-32 (1996).
170. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 291.
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to hold [a federal law] null, void, and no law..... Four years later, this "unlikely"
event occurred.
In June 1954, southern governors met in Virginia and unanimously vowed "not
to comply voluntarily with the Supreme Court's decision." 172 In 1955, a Virginia
lawyer brought the theory of interposition to the attention of the Richmond News-
Leader editor, James Jackson Kilpatrick. 3 Kilpatrick wrote a series of editorials
calling for the adoption by the Virginia legislature of an interposition resolution
declaring Brown "null and void, and of no effect." 74 The legislature did so in
1956, as did other southern states over the next two years. 75
Virginia's Interposition and Nullification Resolution, typical of the southern
nullification legislation, declared in part:
That the General Assembly of Virginia expresses its firm resolution to maintain
and to defend the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of this
State, against every attempt, whether foreign or domestic, to undermine the dual
structure of this Union, and to destroy those fundamental principles embodied
in our basic law, by which the delegated powers of the Federal government and
the reserved powers of the respective States have long been protected and
assured;
that the powers of the Federal Government result solely from the compact to
which the States are parties; [that the Supreme Court has no power to amend the
Constitution and];
that by its decision of May 17, 1954, in the school cases, the Supreme Court of
the United States placed upon the Constitution an interpretation, having the
effect of an amendment thereto...;
[that the] clear understanding over a long period of years and held repeatedly
that the power to operate ... [separate] schools was, indeed, a power reserved
to the States to exercise "without intervention of the Federal courts under the
Federal Constitution...";
171. Louis Hartz, South Carolina v. United States, in AMERICA IN CRISIS: FOURTEEN CRUCIAL EPISODES
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 73, 88 (Daniel Aaron ed., 1952).
172. RICHMOND NEWS-LEADER, June 11, 1954, reprinted in BARnEY, supra note 71, at 77. Governors of
eight of the eleven southern states attended. The remaining three Governors (of Arkansas, Tennessee, and Texas)
sent gubernatorial representatives. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 77 n.36.
173. See TusHmE, supra note 3, at 240.
174. Id.
175. See Interposition and Nullification-Alabama, 1 RACE REL L. REP. 437 (1956); Interposition and
Nullification-Arkansas, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 1116 (1956); Interposition and Nullfication-Florida, 2 RACE
REL. L. REP. 707 (1957); Interposition and Nullification-Georgia, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 438 (1956);
Interposition-Louisiana, I RACE REL. L. REP. 753 (1956); Interposition and Nullification-Mississippi, I RACE
REL. L. REP. 440 (1956); Interposition and Nullification-South Carolina, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 443 (1956);
Interposition and Nullification-Virginia, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 445 (1956). The Tennessee House of
Representatives adopted an interposition resolution, but it was not ratified by the Senate. See Interposition and
Nullification-Tennessee, 2 RACE RI. L. REP. 228 (1957). The legislatures of Texas and North Carolina did
not adopt an interposition resolution. See Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation: Desegregating
the South During the Decade After Brown, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 92, 93 n.5 (1994).
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That the General Assembly of Virginia, mindful of the resolution it adopted on
December 21, 1798, ... again asserts this fundamental principle: That
whenever the Federal Government attempts the deliberate, palpable, and
dangerous exercise of powers not granted it, the States who are parties to the
compact have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose...;
we have watched with growing concern as the power delegated to the Congress
to regulate commerce among the several States has been stretched into a power
to control local enterprises remote from interstate commerce; we have witnessed
... the advancing tendency to read into a power to lay taxes for the general
welfare a power to confiscate the earnings of our people for purposes unrelated
to the general welfare as we conceive it; we have been dismayed at judicial
decrees permitting private property to be taken for uses that plainly are not
public uses; we are disturbed at the effort now afoot to distort the power to
provide for the common defense, by some Fabian alchemy, into a power to build
local schoolhouses;
[Virginia appeals to her sister States and] respectfully requests them to join her
in taking appropriate steps, pursuant to Article V of the [U.S.] Constitution, by
which an amendment, designed to settle the issue of contested power here
asserted, may be proposed to all the States. [and until that question is settled by
Constitutional amendment, Virginia resolves] to take all appropriate measures
honorably, legally and constitutionally available to us, to resist this illegal
encroachment upon our sovereign powers ... 176
The interposition resolutions paraphrased the above Virginia document, which
itself borrowed greatly from the original Virginia Resolution of 1798.'" The
resolutions defended the compact theory of the Union-that the states had created
the federal government and had surrendered to the federal government only those
few powers enumerated in the compact. All other powers, including control over
public school policies, remained a state possession, and as such, were protected by
the Tenth Amendment. 78 The southern states argued that ratification of the
176. Interposition and Nullification-Virginia, 1 RACE REL L. RE'. 445-47 (1956).
177. The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 were drafted by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson
and adopted by the legislatures of Kentucky and Virginia on November 13, 1798 and December 24, 1798,
respectively. See STANLEY ELKuts AND ERIC MCKnmcK, THE AoE oF FEDERAusM 719-20 (1993). The
resolutions 1798 unsuccessfully urged other states to join them in securing the repeal of the Alien and Sedition
Acts. See id The Virginia Resolution of 1798 asserted:
mhe Constitution to which the contracting states had assented delegated certain powers to
the federal government, specifically enumerated, all others not so delegated being reserved
to the states; that "in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers
not granted by the said compact, the states ... are in duty bound to interpose for arresting
the progress of the evil."
Id (quoting the Virginia Resolution of 1798). No other state joined in this interposition. The principle objection
of other states was that it was up to the national judiciary, not the states, to determine whether a federal law was
constitutional. See id at 720.
178. See JOHN C. MIu.ER, THE FEDERALST ERA 1789-1801 239 (1960). Miller states:
According to Jefferson's and Madison's reading of the Constitution, it created nothing more
than a compact between sovereign states which confided certain narrowly defined powers to
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Fourteenth Amendment did not change the nature of the state-federal compact or
circumscribe the states' right to segregate facilities. 79 Therefore, Brown was an
amendment to the Constitution, not an interpretation of its intent, and a state had
both the right and duty to resist the Court's illegal amendment until the issue was
settled by a valid constitutional amendment."s
Interposition provided the theory that justified Massive Resistance. The doctrine
was advocated, explained, and debated by the southern media and politicians and
became a fixture in the southern vernacular.181 A typical explication of the
doctrine issued during a "Rush Limbaughesque" radio address in Texas follows:
If you believe in the right of contract, and everyone but a Communist does, then
you believe in interposition. If you look over a menu and order ham and eggs
for breakfast, you have made a contract. If Brussels sprouts and beans are
brought to you instead, you as a partner in that contract, interpose your
objections, and refuse to eat and pay for them. Interposition, in spite of all the
political mumbo-jumbo, is just as... Constitutional as ham and eggs."s
Actually, interposition was more constitutional than ham and eggs-"ham and
eggs" does not even arguably show up in the Constitution. The "mumbo-jumbo"
relied on by the advocates of interposition were the political theories of Thomas
Jefferson, James Madison, John C. Calhoun, and other pre-Civil War theorists."8 3
Although the interposition doctrine had an august pedigree, many acknowledged
that the interposition resolutions had no legal effect-for example, Calhoun's theory
of the Constitution had not been widely embraced before the Civil War and the
defeat of the South in 1865 extinguished its vitality.'"
the general government while reserving all residual powers to the states .... In effect, the
states were called upon to mediate between the people and the Federal government, but it was
assumed that usurpation would always come from the Federal government rather than from
the states.
Id Thus, under the compact theory, the states reserve the right to be the final judges of federal authority. Justice
Clarence Thomas recently revived the compact theory of government. See United States Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1875 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
179. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 131-32.
180. The states differed on what the content of that "valid" constitutional amendment should be. See id
Arkansas and Mississippi asserted in their resolutions that desegregation should be suspended until an
amendment authorizing dual school systems could be submitted to the states. See id However, most resistance
spokesmen took the Calhounian view, arguing that interposition was valid until other states approved a
constitutional amendment declaring educational segregation illegal. See id. at 219-20.
Many of the southern states, like Madison 150 years before, took the position that they did not have to reach
the issue of what the proper remedy should be for a violation of the compact and vaguely called for a
constitutional change "designed to settle the issue of contested power here asserted." See id. at 132. As far as
I can tell, there was no serious discussion during the 1950s of the mechanics of nullification comparable to the
procedures outlined by John C. Calhoun. See MCCOY, supra note 24, at 132 (describing Calhoun's formal steps
for nullification). For a general discussion of the different theories of "states' rights," see RICHARD E. ELLIS,
THE UNION AT RISK: JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY, STATES' RIGHTS, AND THE NULLFiCATION CRISIS (1987).
181. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 132.
182. ld at 127.
183. See id
184. Lewis F. Powell, as superintendent of the public schools in Richmond, Virginia (and later a U.S.
Supreme Court Justice), "wrote a legal memorandum stating that interposition was 'simply legal nonsense' that
no court would ever adopt." TusHNET, supra note 3, at 240. Powell refrained from publishing his memo when
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In 1958, in Cooper v. Aaron,1 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the arguments
underlying the interposition resolutions. In a 1960 federal district court opinion,
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board,'"' which was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the district court extensively analyzed the interposition doctrine and found
that the keystone of the interposition thesis-that the United States is a compact of
States-"was disavowed in the Preamble to the Constitution."' s  Relying on
Cooper, among other cases, the Bush court made clear that "interposition is not a
constitutional doctrine," that, "[h]owever solemn or spirited, interposition
resolutions have no legal efficacy."' n Further, the Bush court noted, citing The
Federalist Papers Numbers 78, 80, 81, and 82, that the Supreme Court is the final
arbiter of the limits of the Tenth Amendment and that it would be a "perversion of
Article V of the [U.S.] Constitution" to validate the states' claim to temporarily
annul Brown pending a constitutional amendment.1 Thus, to the extent that
interposition had been used as a method for a state to "constitutionally" disagree
with, and therefore ignore, a federal decree, the Court made clear through its
decision in Cooper and its affirmance of Bush that the Court-not the states-had
the final word concerning the reach of federal power.
Although the interposition resolutions legally can be dismissed as "absurd," they
provided the inspiration for Massive Resistance.' 90 Interposition was the
emotional impetus for the White Citizens' Councils that effectuated the
operative-as opposed to the theoretical-defiance of Brown.'9' Interposition
"told that state officials took the doctrine seriously as 'a proper and effective method of protesting against the
decision of the Supreme Court.' Id Virginia's Attorney General, Lindsay Almond, also thought the
interposition resolution was "legally meaningless." See id at 241; see also Opinion of Attorney General of
Virginia, dated February 14, 1956, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 462-64 (1956) (Brown cannot be nullified by state
resolution or ordinance.).
185. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Cooper is discussed in more detail infra Part V.C.
186. 188 F. Supp. 916 (E.D. La. 1960), afft'd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961).
187. Id. at 923.
188. Id. at 926.
189. Id. at 924-26. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed- Constitutional Amendment Outside
Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994).
190. State nullification is not merely a historical relic. Recently, Governor Huckabee of Arkansas refused to
authorize a Medicaid payment for an abortion in a case of incest, despite a federal judge's order that such payments
were required by federal law. According to Governor Huckabee, "his first obligation was to obey the Arkansas State
Constitution, rather than Federal law." Arkansas Governor Blocks Medicaid Payment for an Abortion in Incest
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,1996, at A8, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, NYT File. Similarly, in 1994,
Governor Casey of Pennsylvania announced that he would defy a federal directive requiring state Medicaid
programs to pay for abortions in cases of rape or incest. See Robert Pear, Pennsylvania Defies U.S. Abortion Rule,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 19,1994, at A12, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, NYT File. A few months later,
eleven states had followed Pennsylvania's lead. See Christopher Connell, Eleven States Seen as Flouting Abortion
Rule, BOSTON GLOBE, May 7,1994, at 3, available in WESTLAW. ALLNEWS Library, 1994 WL 5968161, at *3.
191. After Brown 11, as blacks began to file desegregation petitions, non-legislative resistance
erupted-violence, economic reprisals against blacks, and the terror campaign of the White Citizens' Council
component of Massive Resistance. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 82-84. This resistance movement reached
its peak during 1956, and by 1957 was already in a gradual decline. See id. at 84. Numerous segregationist
groups formed throughout the South. See id An estimated fifty such organizations formed in the years
immediately following Brown. See id at 83. Many of these organizations had titles couched in federalism
terms-e.g., the States' Rights Council of Georgia and the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual
Liberties of Virginia. See id at 94.
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resolutions, merely policy statements, were given practical effect through rapid and
creatively evasive legislative enactments. 9' In the three years following the
Brown decision, southern legislatures passed 450 laws designed to circumvent and
delay desegregation. 193 Southern legal evasion was, in general, of two kinds: (1)
school closings and funding cut-off laws, and (2) pupil placement statutes.194 The
Supreme Court rejected the former19 and allowed the latter.1"
2. Political Parties/States' Rights
Political parties are one of the principal institutions that distribute power between
state and federal government." Political parties are the referees of
federalism.1 According to Kramer, parties perform this valuable function by
"linking the fortunes of officeholders at state and federal levels, fostering a mutual
dependency that protects state institutions by inducing federal lawmakers to take
account of (at least some) desires of state officials."' 99 However, after Brown, the
192. See GOLDFIED, supra note 137, at 79-80.
193. See id at 79. While a number of these laws were defiant, for example, criminalizing the act of
attending desegregated schools or prohibiting state officials from attempting to integrate schools, the majority
of them were merely evasive. See Douglas, supra note 175, at 93 n.6.
As James Kilpatrick advised, the best way to defeat Brown was "to take lawful advantage of every moment
of the law's delays .... Litigate? Let us pledge ourselves to litigate this thing for fifty years. If one remedial
law is ruled invalid, then let us try another, and if the second law is ruled invalid, then let us enact a third."
GOLDFIELD, supra note 137, at 80 (quoting James J. Kilpatrick, editor of the RICHMOND NEwS-LEADER). As
one observer quipped. "Mhe Court's decision was the greatest thing that has happened to the legal profession
since the invention of the ambulance." Id
194. The pupil placement laws, which ten southern states enacted shortly after Brown, theoretically
comported with Brown. The pupil placement laws allowed states to make a gradual change by permitting school
officials to segregate black students, ostensibly for a number of reasons other than race. See WILKINSON, supra
note 17, at 84. However, in practice, these laws required a complicated and intimidating set of procedures and
hearings for any student wishing to transfer in order to discourage blacks from even making the attempt. See
id at 84 n.36. In addition, elaborate procedures provided a school board the opportunity to deny a transfer
request for a technical reason, for example, failure to have the request notarized or for a missed hearing. See
PELTASON, supra note 117, at 79. These procedures transferred the burden of desegregation from the school
official to the black student. See id at 79-80. Finally, "these schemes allow(ed] school officials to take
advantage of the 'doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies' and to prevent class suits." Id. See
generally Note, The Federal Courts and Integration of Southern Schools: Troubled Status of the Pupil
Placement Acts, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1448 (1962).
However, in McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963), the Court held that plaintiffs challenging
school segregation need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court.
195. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (ordering county officials to reopen and fund a
racially non-discriminatory public school system).
196. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala. 1958). affid, 358 U.S. 101
(1958) (upholding state's pupil placement law). In 1968, in Green v. County School of New Kent County. 391
U.S. 430 (1968), the Supreme Court struck down "freedom of choice" techniques and pupil placement plans.
197. See Kramer, supra note 118, at 1522-23 ("Over the course of American history, the principal institution
in brokering state/federal relations ... has been the political party.").
198. See id As Kramer has pointed out, after the failure of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, the
natural fault line between federal and state ceased to exist because of the emergence of political parties. See id
at 1492. In the Virginia Resolution of 1798, Madison followed his own advice from THE FEDERAUST No.
46-he used the state legislature to rally opposition to a federal law. See id at 1519. When this failed, Madison
turned to the Republican Party to build a coalition to eradicate the Alien and Sedition Acts. See id
199. Id at 1523.
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South found itself politically alienated from the rest of the nation, not fitting
comfortably within either the Democratic or the Republican Party.
As described below, during the 1950s, there was a feeble attempt by southern
politicians to bypass the national parties and revive a third party, the Independent
States' Rights Party, with a platform that focused on the federal-state division of
power.2 ° The States' Rights Party-an embodiment of nullification and state
sovereignty-failed to capture the national government in its effort to protect state
interests."' Political parties, to be successful, must hold together diverse,
heterogeneous interests; parties based on a single ideology, like the States' Rights
Party, are doomed to fail.2' Although it is not surprising that the States' Rights
Party failed nationwide, it is interesting to note how dismally it performed even in
the southern states at the height of Massive Resistance. °3 This failure occurred
because the national parties were willing to protect the southern states' interests in
order to capture southern votes.
2W
To understand the role of the national parties in the 1950s, we need to briefly
review the relationship between national politics and race-relations prior to that
period. Although a Republican Congress had passed civil rights legislation in the
years immediately following the Civil War, after Reconstruction both national
parties avoided civil rights."  In 1910 when civil rights activists requested the
Republican Justice Department to intervene to address the problem of lynching in
the southern states, the Department declined, claiming that it lacked authority to
protect black citizens' civil rights.' Indeed, Republican President Taft stated in
his 1909 inaugural address that "[i]t is not the disposition or within the province of
the Federal Government to interfere with the regulation by the Southern States of
their domestic affairs." Accordingly, the election of 1912 marked the first
significant defection of the black vote from the Republican Party.
2W8
President Roosevelt's New Deal undermined traditional states' rights attitudes by
increasing the federal government's responsibility for economic matters in an effort
to promote (in a nonracial sense) social equality.? 9 Roosevelt brought millions
of black citizens to the Democratic Party.210 In 1940, President Roosevelt's
200. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 163-66.
201. See id. at 165-66.
202. See ERic FONER, PoLrrics AND IDEoLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIviL. WAR 34 (1980). Foner states:
[Alithough party competition requires that there be differences between the major parties,
these differences usually have not been along sharp ideological lines. In fact, the very
diversity of American society has inhibited the formation of ideological parties, for such
parties assume the existence of a single line of social division along which a majority of the
electorate can be mobilized. In a large, heterogeneous society, such a line rarely exist.
Ld.
203. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 165.
204. See Id. at 168-69.
205. See O'REILLY, supra note 146, at 80-81.
206. See id. at 77.
207. Id. at 78.
208. See id. at 81. Democratic Presidential candidate Woodrow Wilson received about 7% of the black vote.
See id. at 83.
209. See generally BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 29-30.
210. See O'REiu Y, supra note 146, at 108.
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Attorney General, Frank Murphy, established a Civil Liberties Unit (renamed the
Civil Rights Section in 1941) within the Justice Department which legitimized for
the first time in the twentieth century, the idea that the federal government had the
right and duty to investigate and prosecute civil rights violations."' The
following year, Roosevelt established a Fair Employment Practice Committee in
Executive Order 8802-"the first presidential directive on race since
Reconstruction.2 12 On June 29, 1947, President Truman addressed an NAACP
rally in front of the Lincoln Memorial, vowing federal involvement in the
enforcement of civil rights.1 3
In 1948, a progressive civil rights plank was introduced at the Democratic
National Convention in Philadelphia.2 4 As one of the proponents noted: "It was
time... for the Democratic [P]arty to come out of the shadow of states' rights and
into the broad sunshine of human rights.''215  Leslie Dunbar, former executive
director of the Southern Regional Council, referred to the new support of civil rights
by the executive branch and the national Democratic Party as the "repeal of the
Compromise of 1877. ''216 Southern Democrats (the "Dixiecrats") revolted by
walking out of the convention and forming a third party that "sought to counter the
growing attack on southern social institutions, to restore rural-small town concepts
of laissezfaire economics, and to reassert the sovereign rights of states. 217
Although the Dixiecrats tried to imitate the Compromise of 1877 in the 1948
Presidential election by forcing the selection of the President to the House of
Representatives, their efforts failed when "Truman won a comfortable majority of
electoral votes despite defections from the Deep South."2 8 Southern support of
the Republican Party intensified in the 1952 presidential election. Eisenhower won
four southern states and, while he did not win a single Deep South state, the election
211. See id at 122.
212. Id. at 134.
213. See id at 153-54. Truman stated:
Our national government must show the way. This is a difficult and complex undertaking.
Federal laws and administrative machinery must be improved and expanded. We must
provide the government with better tools to do the job .... Every man should have the right
to a decent home, the right to an education .... We must insure that these rights-on equal
terms-are enjoyed by every citizen.
Id. at 154 (emphasis added). The year before, by Executive Order 9808, President "Truman... established the
President's Committee on Civil Rights." Id. at 152.
214. See id. at 156.
215. Id. at 159-60 (quoting Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) activist, Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.).
216. BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 3-4 (quoting Leslie Dunbar).
217. Id at 32. The political leaders fueling the Dixiecrat "movement were primarily state officials. Watching
their authority [gravitate] to Washington, many state Democratic politicians seized upon the Dixiecrat revolt as
a genuine assertion of states' rights." Id at 34.
218. id at 36. Although Truman's victory deflated the states' right movement somewhat, "hard-core
Dixiecrats kept the movement alive." Id at 36. On May 10, 1949, Dixiecrats from fourteen states gathered in
Jackson, Mississippi to organize the National States' Rights Committee. See id The Supreme Court's decisions
in 1950 in Sweart, Henderson, and McLaurin increased southern "concern over social change." Id at 32. Indeed,
the Dixiecrats anticipated that the Supreme Court would "go all the way and say there can be no such thing as
separate and equal facilities." Id at 37.
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results revealed a growing dissatisfaction with the domestic policies of the
Democratic Party
219
The States' Rights movement elevated the opposition to Brown from the depths
of sectional racism to the more rarified air of state sovereignty. Although white
supremacy plainly was the driving motivation, the movement can be viewed more
broadly as a genuine reaffirmation of states' rights.' The widely held view was
that Brown was merely the occasion, rather than the cause, for the strong reassertion
of states' sovereignty.22 Indeed, as the Virginia interposition resolution
exemplifies, many of the interposition resolutions dealt specifically with federal
encroachments in non-racial areas.
2=
The States' Rights Party utilized an informational program to counter NAACP
public relations efforts.W This propaganda campaign, aimed both to dissuade
southern dissension and to transform a regional issue into a national one, consisted
of national political speeches, newspaper editorials, and political pamphlets.'
A typical speech occurred during a Farmers-Merchants banquet in Iowa:
"May I say to you that when any court takes leave of the law and starts
rendering edicts based on sociology, it is high time for all Americans to wake
up ... . If any court can tell the people of Mississippi or Louisiana that they
shall run their public schools according to the theories of certain social
revolutionaries, then the Court can tell the people of Iowa or Nebraska that they
shall run their schools according to notions equall as radical. If our States'
Rights are usurped with impunity, are yours safe?""
219. See id. at 47-51. According to Bartley, in the five presidential elections prior to 1952, the most votes
a Republican candidate had received in South Carolina had been 4.5% of the vote, in Louisiana 19.4%. in
Mississippi 6.4%; in 1952, however, Eisenhower received 49.3% of the vote in South Carolina, 47.1% in
Louisiana, and 39.6% in Mississippi. See id at 50. Alabama and Georgia voters showed similar, though less
dramatic, shifts toward the Republican Party. See id
220. Commenting on the phenomena of Massive Resistance, Klarman posits: "It... seems likely, given the
legendary southern aversion to outside interference, dating back at least to federal military occupation and the
imposition of carpetbagger regimes during Reconstruction, that a United States Supreme Court decree mandating
school desegregation evoked greater southern hostility than similarly directed local legislative initiatives would
have." Klarman, supra note 79, at 809. The writer William Faulkner, a leading spokesman for gradualism, noted
in the spring of 1956: "A few of us realize that segregation is going, but the job shoull be accomplished by
choice from within the South." BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 14 (quoting William Faulkner); see Klarman, supra
note 153, at 109-10 ("Just as southern racial progressives in the 1920s and 1930s had supported state, but not
federal, anti-lynching legislation, so did many southern liberals in the postwar years favor local initiatives to
ameliorate Jim Crow practices, while warning that federal intervention would cause more harm than good."
(citation omitted)).
221. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 28-46. During the 1940s a growing political reaction emerged in the
South, expressing anti-New Deal sentiment. See id. at 29. "By 1944, the anti-New Deal movement had been
reinforced by a more distinctly racial reaction" spurred by the Court's decision in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944), which declared all-white primaries unconstitutional. See id
222. See id at 114.
223. See id. at 182.
224. See generally id at 181-85.
225. Id at 184 (quoting William Simmons) (alteration in original). According to Bartley, the propaganda
focused on three themes: the constitutional guarantees of states' rights and the consequent "unconstitutionality"
of Brown; the alleged biological and sociological inferiority of blacks; and the premise that the civil rights
movement was a foreign plot, a conspiracy dominated and directed by Communist subversives. See id. at 184-85.
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In the same way that expansion of slavery into the territories was politically
critical for southern support of slavery, expansion of a states' rights platform into
a national platform was critical to the southern enterprise to "overrule" Brown.
However, during the 1956 presidential election, the States' Rights Party failed to
win a plurality in a single state and received more than 10% of the vote in only
South Carolina and Mississippi.' The failure of the States' Rights Party to
displace, even within the southern states, the national parties- parties with interests
beyond the federal/state divide-supports the premise that the political party system
is an institution that makes federalism in the United States work.m Although the
southern states were unable to overthrow Brown through the States' Rights Party,
southern voters were able to play to both the Democratic and Republican Parties in
the 1950s (a political phenomena referred to as the "Southern Strategy"), preventing
Brown from attaining congressional or presidential support.m
After the Dixiecrat revolt of 1948, it became clear that the "solid South" was no
longer captive to the Democratic Party.' Thus, the Democrats' effort to appeal
to northern black voters was counter-balanced by the need to pacify the southern
white electoral vote. At the same time, the Republican Party, a pariah in the South
since Reconstruction, began to vie for southern votes.' The Republicans'
southern strategy was successful-Eisenhower's civil rights conservativism enabled
him to win four southern states in 1952 and five in 1956."
The Republican success did not go unnoticed. In 1956, the Democratic Party
specifically refused to endorse Brown in its convention platform. 2 As a result,
civil rights progress on the federal level was effectively blocked, as long as both
national parties sought to balance the competing considerations of supporting civil
rights and appeasing the South. The failure of the States' Rights Party reveals that
most southerners were satisfied with the ability of the two-party system to shore up
segregation and states' rights.
V. THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS
As noted above, a vacuum of political leadership emerged in the wake of Brown.
Congress and the President left the Court to deal with desegregation and southern
recalcitrance, and local statesmen were politically incapable of shouldering the
226. See id at 165-67.
227. See generally Kramer, supra note 118. at 1501.
228. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 60 (During the 1950s, Congress was incapable of acting on the issue
of civil rights; southern legislators kept Congress "deadlocked" during most of the decade.); see also Klarman,
supra note 153, at 135-36 ("Mhe presidential politics of the 1950s reveals that... the immediate political
imperative of balancing appeals to northern blacks and liberals against those to southern white racial
conservatives deterred either party from charting bold new paths on civil rights.").
229. See Klarman, supra note 153. at 133. Klarman explains: "Through the Roosevelt years, the Democratic
Party had run up totals of 70% to 80% in presidential contests in the South. From the end of Reconstruction
through World War II, the Republican Party had performed dismally in Southern elections, both at the national
and local levels." Id
230. See JACK BASS & WALTER DE VRIES, THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOuTHERN POLITICS: SOCIAL
CHANGE & POLITICAL CONSEQUENCE SINCE 1945 4-5 (1976).
231. See Klarman, supra note 153, at 132. Cf supra note 219.
232. See id at 134.
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burden. g3 The Little Rock Crisis' can be viewed as a casualty of this political
vacuum-segregationists were able to take control of a racially-moderate urban city
and force a federal-state confrontation.2s In Cooper v. Aaron,236 the judicial
response to the Little Rock Crisis, the Court explained that, while states could create
the rules of desegregation, they could not reject the premise of desegregation
because that premise was the "supreme law of the land." 7 Thus, the Court in
Cooper made clear to the nation that Massive Resistance was unconstitutional and
segregationists were outlaws." s
A. Initial Incidents239
Violence erupted during the Brown-inspired Montgomery bus boycott in 1955.
When Martin Luther King, Jr., pleaded for the federal government to intervene to
provide security, Warren Olney, United States Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Criminal Division, declined: "Notwithstanding our deep aversion to violent
acts of the sort you describe... the primary responsibility for the maintenance of
law and order is lodged in state and local authorities. [The Federal Government has
no general police power."'  Olney ignored King's complaint that the local
233. See generally O'RELLY, supra note 146, at 181; BARTrLEY, supra note 71, at 252.
234. In early September 1957, Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas defied a federal court school
desegregation order and instructed the National Guard to prevent nine black students from enrolling at the
previously all-white Central High School. See O'REILLY, supra note 146, at 180. Because Governor Faubus
used state troops to oppose federal authority, the Little Rock Crisis was probably the most serious federal-state
confrontation since the Civil War. See infra Part V.B.
235. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 251.
236. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
237. See iL at 18.
238. See id.
239. Between 1954 and 1960 there were at least twelve incidents in which rioters, sometimes
with the tacit encouragement of state and local officials, tried to thwart the execution of a
federal court order. Except in [a few of these incidents, such as Little Rock] federal executive
authorities refused to intervene, and they [intervened] in these instances only after local
officials begged for help.
PELTASON, supra note 117, at 51.
In addition to official acts of obstruction of desegregation orders, numerous violent acts of racist vigilantism
followed Brown. See BELKNAP, supra note 29, at 28-29. Between January 1, 1955, and January 1, 1959, the
southern states experienced 210 recorded incidents of Ku Klux Klan intimidation attributable to the increased
racial tensions generated by the Brown decision. See id Throughout Massive Resistance, the President and the
Justice Department insisted that controlling the violence was a state and local responsibility. See ia at 18-19.
Belknap notes that this deference to the southern states survived "even the vast increases in the powers and
activity of the national government brought about by the Progressive reform movement, the World War I
mobilization effort, and Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal." Id at 19.
Evidently, these coercive tactics were "effective"-in Mississippi, for example, from 1955 until at least 1961,
not a single desegregation lawsuit was filed in all of Mississippi. See PELTASON, supra note 117, at 58.
240. BELzNAP, supra note 29, at 36. In addition, President Eisenhower distanced himself and the federal
government from the Montgomery bus boycott launched on December 5, 1955 by Rosa Parks' famous refusal.
See O'REilLY, supra note 146, at 171. He would not intervene when the city swore out arrest warrants for
Martin Luther King, Jr., and other boycott organizers, referring to "a state law about boycotts, and it is under
that kind of thing that these people are being brought to trial." Id (quoting President Dwight D. Eisenhower).
Indeed, Eisenhower was disappointed when the boycott ended with the Supreme Court upholding a special three-
judge panel's order against segregation on intrastate buses, noting in his diary: "In some of these things ...
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authorities clearly were not providing the necessary security.'
In February 1956, a riot erupted at the University of Alabama when Autherine
Lucy, a black woman, attended classes.2 2 Lucy was admitted to the historically
segregated university by a federal court order. She was attending her third day
of classes when the state police, instead of controlling the mob, removed her from
the school.' After Lucy accused school officials of conspiring with the rioters,
she was permanently expelled and the University of Alabama remained
segregated.' " Although the rioters at the University of Alabama successfully
blocked a federal court desegregation order, President Eisenhower did nothing,
insisting that it was a state matter, best handled at the state level.'
Six months later, Governor Allan Shivers of Texas intervened in two Texas
communities facing federal desegregation orders. 7  When mobs opposed to
desegregation formed at the two schools, Shivers sent in the Texas Rangers to
maintain order and protect segregation.' Shivers issued a public statement that
hostility to desegregation took precedence over federal court orders.u9 At a press
conference a few days later, Eisenhower reiterated that the maintenance of order was
primarily a state matter.'
President Eisenhower signed the Civil Rights Act of 1957, "the first [such]
legislation since Reconstruction" on September 9, 1957.25' The Civil Rights Act
gave the federal government the power to enjoin any obstruction of voting
rights. 2  The Act also created a Civil Rights Commission and conferred full
divisional status to the Civil Rights section of the Justice Department.2 3
MI] was more of a 'States' Righter' than the Supreme Court." Id (quoting President Dwight D. Eisenhower)
(alteration in original).
241. See BELKNAP, supra note 29, at 36.
242. See O'REILY, supra note 146, at 172.
243. See id
244. See id
245. See id
246. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 64.
247. See PELTASON, supra note 117, at 145.
248. See id
249. Governor Shivers also stated that "[i]f this course is not satisfactory under the circumstances to the
federal government, I respectfully suggest further that the Supreme Court, which is responsible for the order,
be given the task of enforcing it." Id. at 147.
The legal claim that the need to maintain order excuses officials from obeying desegregation decrees derives
from a Florida Supreme Court decision, State ex rel Hawkins v. Board of Control, 93 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1957).
See PELTASON, supra note 117, at 146. In 1949, Virgil Hawkins began a nine-year quest to gain admittance to
the University of Florida Law School. See id at 146. Even after Brown, and after the U.S. Supreme Court three
times instructed the Florida Supreme Court to order Hawkins admitted, the Florida court refused. See id While
conceding that segregation was unconstitutional, the Florida jurists maintained that Florida retained the power
to maintain order: "If Hawkins were to attend the University of Florida, there would be 'violence in university
communities' and a 'critical disruption of the University system."' Id. at 147 (quoting Hawkins, 93 So.2d at
359). Therefore, the judges refused to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the university to admit Hawkins. The
same rationale was relied upon in the Alabama and Texas incidents. See PELTASON, supra note 117, at 145.
250. See PELTASON, supra note 117, at 146.
251. See O'REnILY, supra note 146, at 180.
252. See id
253. See id
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The original bill, proposed by United States Attorney General Brownell, had
included a provision empowering the Attorney General to initiate civil suits to
challenge school segregation.' However, lack of White House and Congressional
support led the Senate to eliminate the Attorney General's power to initiate civil
suits, except for those dealing with voting rights. 5
While the Civil Rights bill was being debated, President Eisenhower stated that
he could not "imagine any set of circumstances that would ever induce [him] to send
Federal troops ... into any area to enforce the order of a federal court."'  This
executive statement was the straw that broke the back of the Court's
compromise. 7
B. Events of the Little Rock Crisis
Numan V. Bartley suggests that "[o]f all the southern cities, Little Rock
[Arkansas] was among the least likely scenes for a dramatic confrontation between
state and federal power.""2  Little Rock, comparatively speaking, was a
progressive, non-Deep South capital city. It was one of the first communities below
the Potomac to make preparations for compliance with Brown and a community
with no record of political extremism on racial issues; and a city that had already
desegregated in fringe social settings like city buses. 9 In 1955, blacks enrolled
in five of the six white colleges without intervention from Governor Faubus.'
As Anthony Lewis has written, Little Rock was "a city of the New South, a middle-
class, moderate town with an enlightened mayor (Woodrow Wilson Mann),
congressman (Brook Hays) and newspaper (The Arkansas Gazette, edited by Harry
Ashmore)."' ' Bartley argues that the Little Rock Crisis occurred, not as a result of
the Massive Resistance strategy, but due to a breakdown in community leadership,
compounded by the refusal of the state and federal governments to accept
responsibility for desegregation. 2 The school board failed to prepare the
community for desegregation, couching compliance in terms of a necessary evil; the
city government, in a lame duck status, avoided the issue; and in the end, Governor
254. See id
255. See id at 179. Even in the voting rights area, the Eisenhower administration was reluctant to intervene
in state affairs. After the Civil Rights Act of 1957 was enacted, and even though violations were a persistent
and widespread problem, the Justice Department filed only four suits, only one of which ended in a conviction
and a penalty of two and one-half months in prison. See MARY FRANCES BERRY, BLACK RESISTANCE, WHITE
LAW: A HISTORY OF CONSTITUmONAL RACISM IN AMERICA 144 (1994).
256. O'REILLY, supra note 146, at 180-81 (quoting President Dwight D. Eisenhower).
257. See PELTASON, supra note 117, at 53 ("Moderates had been telling their communities that the federal
government was going to force them to integrate so that the only wise course was to accept the fact that
integration must come and try to contain it."). Unfortunately, Eisenhower's abstention undermined the credibility
of the moderates' position.
258. BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 251.
259. See id
260. See WILKINSON, supra note 17, at 89.
261. ANrHONY LEWIs, PORTRAIT OF A DECADE: THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUION 47 (1964). Indeed,
Mr. Ashmore was one of the southern journalists who won the Pulitzer Prize in the decade after Brown for
advocation of unpopular views of race and education. See WILKInSON, supra note 17, at 319 n.58.
262. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 252.
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Faubus reluctantly filled a leadership void by coming to the defense of
segregation. 3
On May 18, 1954, the day after Brown, the Little Rock school board instructed
Virgil Blossom, the superintendent of schools, to begin drafting a compliance
plan.264 Days later, the school authorities made a public announcement regarding
their decision to comply-there was no suggestion of defiance of the Supreme
Court.' Over the next year, Blossom worked on the plan.' Based upon an
opinion poll of the community that revealed that the prevailing sentiment was to
respect the law while delaying social change as much as possible and that white
parents with young children were more opposed to desegregation than those with
older children, Blossom's plan provided for gradual desegregation beginning with
the city's high schools.267
Although the Capital Citizens' Council was a small voice in Little Rock, it was
essentially the only voice in the void left by local officials.' In the spring of
1957, the Capital Citizens' Council launched a propaganda campaign against
integration, demanding that Governor Faubus intervene to prevent violence and
preserve the dual school system.' Fearing difficulties, school authorities
scrambled for support in the summer of 1957.
Blossom attempted and failed to gain a commitment from the Chief of Police.270
Blossom appealed to Federal District Judge Miller for a public pronouncement on
the consequences of obstructing the court-approved desegregation plan, but the
judge refused.27 Governor Faubus rejected Blossom's request for a public
statement promising to maintain order and to permit no obstruction to
integration. 2 Faubus consistently insisted that desegregation was a local issue,
best left up to individual school districts.273 However, when asked about
segregationist legislation during a press conference in the summer of 1957, Faubus
responded that "everyone knows... state laws can't supersede federal laws," adding
that he would not attempt to nullify federal authority with state legislation.27
263. See id Bartley's explanation differs from other accounts which view the Little Rock Crisis as the result
of a segregationist conspiracy that used Governor Faubus as a puppet or as a political ploy manufactured by
Governor Faubus himself. See BICKEL, supra note 162, at 266 (Governor Faubus controlled by out-of-state
southern leaders); PELTASON, supra note 117, at 35 (describing Governor Faubus as an "acute practitioner of
southern politics").
264. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 253.
265. See id.
266. See id
267. See id at 255.
268. See id at 256-57.
269. See id at 257.
270. See id at 259.
271. See id
272. See id
273. See id at 260.
274. See id at 262. According to Bartley, Governor Faubus was not a racist by personal conviction. See id
at 260. When the state legislature met in its 1957 session, Faubus stated his opposition "to any forcible
integration of our public schools. These matters... must be left to the will of the people in the various districts.
The people must decide on the basis of what is best as a whole for each particular area." Id at 261 (quoting
Governor Orval E. Faubus). Thus, Arkansas followed a decentralized policy prior to the fall of 1957 and under
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Governor Faubus found himself in a dilemma as the date for desegregation of
Central High School approached. Faubus had promised that he would not force
integration on an unwilling community, yet he also had indicated an intention not
to subvert federal law with state action. 2 In August 1957, Faubus tried to wash
his hands of the matter by inviting President Eisenhower to provide federal
assistance in the event of trouble.276 Arthur B. Caldwell, the Justice Department
representative sent to Arkansas in response to Faubus' request, responded that the
Eisenhower administration did not wish to get involved and would assume no
advance responsibility for maintaining order. Faubus argued with Caldwell that the
national government should send federal marshals to maintain order in Little
Rock-that it was the federal government's responsibility.2' To Faubus' political
chagrin, the administration leaked to the press a report on the confidential
conversation between Faubus and Caldwell.
Faubus' next step was to initiate and testify in support of a petition to the
chancery court requesting an injunction preventing school authorities from carrying
out the desegregation plan.279 On August 29, 1957, the chancery court granted the
injunction; on August 30, the federal district court voided the chancery court
order.' On September 1, Faubus publicly announced that he had no plans
concerning Little Rock, evidently leaving it to the city officials to deal with the
problem."
However, the next day, Faubus ordered the National Guard to prevent
desegregation in Little Rock.282 Governor Faubus gave the following order to
General Sherman T. Clinger:
You are directed to place off limits to white students those schools for colored
students and to place off limits to colored students those schools heretofore
this arrangement, five Arkansas communities desegregated before the Little Rock Crisis. See id at 262. In Little
Rock, however, both the proponents and opponents of desegregation rejected this arrangement and insisted that
the Governor get involved to maintain order. See id at 263.
275. See id at 262.
276. See id at 263. Around August 20, 1957, Governor Faubus telephoned the United States Justice
Department to ask United States Attorney General Brownell to preserve order in Little Rock. Faubus's position
was that "it was the federal government's court order. It wasn't a state order." BELKNAP, supra note 29, at 44-
45.
"Unable to reach Brownell, Faubus [spoke to] Deputy Attorney General [William] Rogers, who told [Faubus]
that there was very little the Justice Department could do." Id. at 45. Rogers sent Arthur B. Caldwell as a
Justice Department representative to speak with Faubus. Caldwell was already familiar with the situation, having
visited Little Rock in June at the request of a lawyer for a school district who had sought Justice Department
assistance. See id
In June, when Caldwell returned to Washington, he prepared a memorandum for Assistant Attorney General
Warren Oney IMl discussing the possibility of the Justice Department prosecuting the Capital Citizens' Council
and individuals threatening obstruction of the desegregation order. See id at 36, 45. However, the memo
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to even justify an investigation. See id at 44-45.
277. See BELKNAP, supra note 29, at 46.
278. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 263.
279. See id at 264.
280. See id
281. See id.
282. See id
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operated and recently set up for white students. This order will remain in effect
until the demobilization of the Guard or until further orders. 3
During the following weeks, Faubus insisted that he was not defying a court order,
that he was neither opposing integration nor defending segregation, and that he was
acting only to prevent violence.2'
When Faubus dispatched the National Guard to Central High School on
September 2, 1957, Blossom issued a public statement asking the nine black
children scheduled to integrate the school the next day to remain at home until the
legal issues were resolved.' The school board appealed to the federal district
court for instructions.2s6 Judge Davies ordered the board to carry out its
desegregation plan.W On September 4, the nine black children made their way
through the mob surrounding Central High School, only to be refused admittance
by the National Guard. 2s  On September 5, the school board, citing the
developing tension, petitioned Judge Davies for a temporary suspension of
desegregation."' On September 7, Davies held a hearing and then rejected the
board's request.2' On September 9, Davies ordered the United States Attorney
General to "file immediately a petition" for an injunction against Faubus and the
Arkansas Guard. 291 The Justice Department filed the petition on September 10
and Davies set the hearing for September 20.292
President Eisenhower293 and Governor Faubus met in Rhode Island on
September 14 in an attempt to work things out amicably.2' Eisenhower left the
meeting convinced that he had Faubus' pledge not to obstruct the federal court order
and to change his order to the National Guard so that it would protect the black
students from the white mob.295 After Judge Davies issued the order on September
20, "enjoining Faubus, the National Guard commanders, or any of their agents from
283. President's Power to Use Federal Troops to Suppress Resistance to Enforcement of Federal Court
Orders-Little Rock, Arkansas, 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 313, 317 (Nov. 7, 1957) (quoting Governor Orval E. Faubus)
[hereinafter Brownell Opinion].
284. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 265.
285. See id
286. See id
287. See id Judge Ronald Davies was not from Arkansas; he was from North Dakota and was sitting in
Little Rock on special assignment. See GREENBERG, supra note 33, at 229. Thus, arguably, the community was
less able to sway him than a local district judge (and, perhaps, he them). He was later replaced by Judge Harry
Lemley, an Arkansan, who on June 20, 1958, suspended school integration due to local disorder. See id. at 232.
It was Lemley's order that necessitated Cooper v. Aaron. The response of the two different judges-one local,
one not-exemplifies how the local district judge can be an institution that protects state interests.
288. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 265.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See id
292. See id at 265-66.
293. On September 11, 1957, President Eisenhower complained to Sherman Adams, his Chief of Staff, that
"the whole U.S. thinks the President has a right to walk in and say 'disperse-we are going to have negroes in
the high school and so on.' That is not so." O'REiLLY, supra note 146, at 181 (quoting President Dwight D.
Eisenhower).
294. See id
295. See id
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further obstructing desegregation in Little Rock, Faubus [immediately] removed the
National Guard and departed for a southern governors' conference,... predict[ing]
that violence would [erupt] if desegregation [ensued] ."2'
During the September 21-22 weekend, the Mayor of Little Rock released a
statement calling for peaceful integration.' However, the lame duck Mayor was
unable to rally support for his position and the police department refused to escort
the black children into Central High School.298 Little Rock appealed to both Judge
Davies and the Justice Department to send federal marshals to the city in order to
escort black students to school.2' Judge Davies and the Justice Department
refused.3
On Monday, September 23rd, the black students entered Central High School
under the protection of a few city police and a limited number of state troopers. 301
However, "by lunchtime, the mob outside the school had grown so large and so
belligerent that the [black students] were removed. ' Later that afternoon, the
Mayor of Little Rock requested that the Eisenhower administration send federal
marshals in to restore order. 3 Eisenhower issued a proclamation calling for the
"obstruction of justice to cease. '30 4 Although the black students did not return to
Central High School the next day, September 24th, the situation remained
explosive.30 5 The Mayor, after speaking with several Justice Department officials,
asked Eisenhower to federally intervene in Little Rock.306 Later on September
24th, Eisenhower issued a second proclamation providing "Assistance for the
Removal of an Obstruction of Justice within the State of Arkansas., 3 7 Eisenhower
federalized Arkansas' National Guard and on September 24, the 101st Airborne
Division moved into Little Rock.3' s On September 25th, "federal troops escorted
[the black] students into Central High School and cleared the mobs from the school
area.
30 9
296. BARTLEY, supra note 71,at 267.
297. See id.
298. See id
299. See &L
300. See id
301. See id at 268.
302. 1d
303. See id
304. 1d
305. See id
306. See id After the first proclamation and before the second proclamation, the Mayor of Little Rock wired
the President:
The immediate need for federal troops is urgent. The mob is much larger in numbers at 8
a.m. than at any time yesterday. People are converging on the scene from all directions.
Mob is armed and engaging in fisticuffs and other acts of violence. Situation is out of control
and police cannot disperse the mob. I am pleading to you as president of the United States
in the interest of humanity, law and order[,] and the cause of democracy world wide to
provide the necessary federal troops within several hours. Action by you will restore peace
and order and compliance with your proclamation.
Brownell Opinion, supra note 283, at 328-29.
307. BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 268.
308. See id
309. 1d
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According to Eisenhower, the troops "were not in Little Rock to promote a
[particular civil rights] policy but to fill a vacuum created by the breakdown of
normal law enforcement processes."3"O However, the dispatch of federal troops
to Little Rock was a repudiation of Madison's Dual Federalism principle: 1
when a collision occurred between the national interest (implementation of a
federal court order) and a state interest (public safety and order), the state interest
was subordinated to the national claim.
Bartley complains that during the period between September 2nd and September
20th, Eisenhower failed to back up the federal court order, allowing the Little Rock
dispute to "fester for three weeks without taking the simple expedient of federalizing
the National Guard and changing its orders. 31 However, during this period,
Eisenhower was seeking legal advice from Brownell as to his authority as President
to use federal troops to suppress resistance to enforcement of federal court
orders.
31 3
While Eisenhower is properly criticized for his failure to publicly support the
Brown decision from the beginning-both as a practical matter and as a moral and
constitutional matter-his reluctance to use federal military force is a different issue.
Eisenhower clearly had the authority to intervene in Little Rock, but Bartley is too
dismissive of Eisenhower's efforts to persuade Faubus to provide stability in Little
Rock and comply with the court order. Under our federal system, it is better for the
police power to emanate from the local, as opposed to the national, authority.314
As a pundit once quipped, a smile is nice, but a smile and a gun are better-in
America, it is better still if the gun is held by a local, and not a federal, official.
310. Id.
311. See MIiLLER supra note 178, at 239. Under Dual Federalism, to avoid collisions between the states and
the federal government, "national powers should be construed in deference to the prior claims of the states." i;
see Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see also discussion infta Part V.C.
312. BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 266.
313. See Brownell Opinion, supra note 283, at 313. Citing legal authorities, Brownell advised Eisenhower
that "the United States courts possessed the power to review the action of the Governor in preventing execution
of the Federal court's orders through the use by the Governor of military force ... ." "d at 317. Brownell stated
that "when State officers refuse or fail to discharge their duty in this respect, it becomes the responsibility of
the national Government, through the Chief Executive, to dispel any such forcible resistance to Federal law.
Otherwise, lawlessness would be permitted to exist for lack of any counter-acting force." Id at 324. Additionally,
Brownell advised that Eisenhower had the power to call the National Guard into service and to use those forces,
as well as the Army, to suppress the domestic violence "as President under the Constitution and [under] the
powers vested in [Eisenhower] by the Congress under Federal law, particularly as reflected by sections 332 and
333 of title 10 of the United States Code." Id (citations omitted).
314. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1642 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("mhe Federal
Government has nothing approaching a police power."). An aversion to a militaristic central govemment-a
traditional American theme, see RICHARD B. MORRIS, WITNESSES AT THE CREATION: HAMILTON, MADISON,
JAY, AND THE CoNsTrurFIoN 127-28 (2d ed. 1996) (In response to Alexander Hamilton's plan to give the army
an activist role in the new national government, James Madison cautioned "that there was a long tradition in
America that the military must be subordinate to civilian authority, and ... that standing armies had always been
unpopular.")-must have been especially strong in the post-Hitler, anti-communist era during which the Little
Rock Crisis occurred.
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C. The Court Responds-Cooper v. Aaron
After President Eisenhower sent in federal troops, Little Rock became a mecca
for segregationists, attracting speakers from all over the South. 15 The Capital
Citizens' Council became a stronger voice in urban affairs.316 Massive Resistance
reached its peak during the 1957-58 period. 17 In January 1958, Faubus for the
first time questioned the validity of Brown, declaring that "the Supreme Court
decision is not the law of the land."31 In August 1958, Governor Faubus told "the
Little Rock school board either to come up with a plan to avoid integration or to
resign. 31
9
Following this ultimatum, Faubus called a special legislative session to pass
measures strengthening Arkansas' authority to run the public school system.3 °
Fourteen bills were passed in this special session, including a bill authorizing the
governor to close any school by proclamation. 32 ' Faubus refrained from signing
the bills until after the Supreme Court decided Cooper v. Aaron.3 Once the
Court refused to retreat from its position in Brown, Faubus signed the fourteen bills
and issued a proclamation closing all of Little Rock's high schools.32
The turmoil and animosity of the 1957-58 school year led the Little Rock school
board to ask the federal courts to recognize community hostility to integration and
allow the board to temporarily return to segregation.324 The Supreme Court agreed
to consider the board's request in a special session in August, 1958. 3'5 The first
day of school at Central High was postponed as the Supreme Court and the Arkansas
legislature each held a special session to determine the future of desegregation in
Arkansas.32
In Cooper v. Aaron,327 the Court rejected Arkansas' request to suspend a
judicially-approved school desegregation plan. According to the Court, the case
"raises questions of the highest importance to the maintenance of our federal system
of government" since the Arkansas Governor and Legislature claimed that they had
315. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 257-58.
316. See id.
317. See id. at 270. According to Bartley, the Little Rock Crisis checked a trend toward moderation in the
non-Deep South: during the 1954-57 period, token desegregation had occurred in several districts of Texas,
Tennessee, and Arkansas. See id For example, in 1955, the Governor of Tennessee vetoed local pupil
assignment bills applicable to four small counties on the grounds that they represented "an attempt to circumvent
the efficacy of the recent opinion handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States." Id at 275. In 1957,
the same governor recommended to the Tennessee legislature an anti-integration package, including a stronger
pupil assignment program applicable throughout the state. See id Further, in the fall of 1957, for the first time
pollsters recorded a decline in approval of Brown. See id at 276.
318. Id. at 273.
319. Id. at 273-74.
320. See id at 274.
321. See id
322. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
323. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 274.
324. See id
325. See id
326. See id
327. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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no duty to obey federal court orders.3" The Court's holding was twofold: (1)
violence and disorder, engendered largely by the official actions of the Arkansas
Governor and Legislature, did not justify delaying implementation of the
desegregation plan; and (2) Arkansas' interposition and nullification acts were
invalid. 329  The Court specifically rejected the states' interposition argument,
which supported Massive Resistance, by stating "if the governor of any state says
that a United States Supreme Court decision is not the law of the land, the people
of that state, until it is really resolved, have a doubt in their mind and a right to have
a doubt. 330 Citing Article VI of the Constitution and Marbury v. Madison,
331
the Court held that "the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by
this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land."332 While noting that
public education is primarily a concern of the states, the Court emphasized that these
responsibilities must be exercised consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.
333
Thus, on September 29, 1958, the Court denied the stay and ordered the board to
proceed with its gradual integration plan.33' Faubus closed the schools.335
Although the Court had the Supremacy Clause on its side, Faubus had the keys to
the schools-it would take more than a well-written Supreme Court opinion to
tackle the forces of Massive Resistance.
A number of commentators have reflected on the Court's relative silence in the
years between Brown I and its 1968 Green v. County School Boarda
36
decision. 337  Bartley argues that a quasi-"switch-in-time" occurred during this
period.338  The opposition described above-violent southern resistance, the
political success of southern white supremacy candidates, the mass of anti-
integration state legislation, school closures in Arkansas and Virginia, the threat of
school closures elsewhere, and the Congressional denunciation-caused the
Supreme Court to compromise. 339  Bartley points to the fact that, although in
1958, the Court vigorously reaffirmed the Brown decision in Cooper v. Aaron-a
rejection of open defiance to federal authority-the same year, in Shuttlesworth v.
328. See id at 4.
329. See i
330. Transcript of oral argument in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), in MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT 253
(Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds.. 1993).
331. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
332. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
333. In his concurrence. Justice Frankfurter recognized that the Court relied on state authorities, that
"[c]ompliance with decisions of this Court... depended on active support by state and local authorities" and
that if the states withhold such support, they preclude "the maintenance of our federal system." ld. at 26
(Frnkfurter, J., concurring).
334. See id at 1.
335. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 274-75. On the same day, Governor Almond of Virginia began closing
the Virginia schools that were under federal court orders to desegregate. See id. at 275.
336. 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (invalidating desegregation plans that purported to allow students to "choose" the
schools they wished to attend).
337. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 728 (12th ed. 1991) ("During the early post-Brown
years of 'massive resistance' in the South, the Court broke its silence only rarely.").
338. See generally BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 291-92.
339. See id
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Birmingham,' the Court upheld Alabama's pupil placement law, a scheme
designed to avoid integration." Again, this ignores the fact that the Court was
working within a federal system and needed the states to implement its
desegregation ruling. Shuttlesworth was not a "switch"-the Court had been
offering "compromise" since Brown II. Cooper merely drew a line in the sand of
compromise--rejection of Brown was not cooperation. Pupil placement laws, as
opposed to interposition/Massive Resistance (the subject of Cooper), at least paid
lip-service to the Brown decision and federal supremacy, and, thus, was a form of
cooperation within the bounds of federalism.
D. Lessons of the Little Rock Crisis
It has been said that the Little Rock Crisis was an example of how
"segregationists... us[ed] state governments to force city moderates to resist court
decrees."' 2 Thus, Little Rock reveals the hypocrisy of the states' rights argument
against Brown. While theoretically arguing for local control, the segregationists and
the Arkansas state legislature were intent on stifling local control over
education." The double-speak was evident not only in Arkansas. For example,
Virginia, while claiming the right to make its own decisions on segregation, refused
to allow its more moderate urban cities to do likewise: "We cannot allow Arlington
or Norfolk to integrate," insisted Congressman William Tuck.3" In addition, the
fact that some southern cities, such as Little Rock and Arlington, were more willing
than others to desegregate' is evidence of the Court's wisdom in refusing to
establish a uniform rule of implementation in Brown II.
Since 1954, the Little Rock school officials had prepared to comply with Brown,
as a "necessary evil."3 6 However, without congressional or executive support,
the necessity rationale for compliance dwindled and left a vacuum for
segregationists to control the situation. President Eisenhower's support-sending
in federal troops-was too little, too late. Moderate forces had already been overrun
340. 358 U.S. 101 (1958). In 1957, four black students tried to desegregate the Birmingham schools and took
the test required by the school board. See id Although the statute required the school board to act on
applications within thirty days, the board did nothing and after two months of waiting, the students filed suit.
See id The plaintiffs alleged that Alabama's pupil placement law was part of a package of resistance to
desegregation, but the local district judge found that the court could not examine the legislature's motivation.
See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala. 1958). The Supreme Court affirmed without
hearing oral argument. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
341. Klarman also appears to argue that the Court went through a sort of "switch-in-time," noting that only
after a political coalition emerged committed to eliminating racial segregation, did the Supreme Court invalidate
racially-motivated school closings (Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964)) and reject "freedom of
choice" plans (Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968)). See Klarman, supra note 79, at 813 n.296.
Writing in 1961, Peltason noted that: "The Supreme Court itself has retreated. By affirming pupil-
placement laws, the Court sanctioned token integration .... This is a far cry from the 'full compliance' ...
'at the earliest practicable date,' and complete desegregation 'with all deliberate speed' which was promised by
the Supreme Court's 1955 decision [in Brown 1/]." PELTASON, supra note 117, at 245.
342. PELTASON, supra note 117, at 44.
343. see WLINSoN, supra note 17, at 71.
344. See PELTASON, supra note 117, at 45 (quoting Congressman William M. Tuck of Virginia).
345. See id
346. See id
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by segregationists and would not reappear until faced with school closings. If
Eisenhower had publicly supported Brown from the beginning, even if he also had
indicated that it was a "necessary evil," perhaps the threat of troops would have had
the effect that even the later reality of troops could not muster.
Little Rock also reflected a danger implicit in Brown lH-by co-opting state
authorities to implement Brown, the Court blurred the lines of political
accountability between the states and the federal government. Neither Governor
Faubus nor President Eisenhower wanted to accept political responsibility for the
desegregation that needed to occur in Little Rock. 7 Both state and federal
officials insisted that it was the other's responsibility to provide order in Little Rock.
Far from being a situation of a President usurping local and state officials by
military force, the local school board, the Mayor, and the Governor all begged the
federal government to intervene in Little Rock.' Local school authorities wanted
federal judges to "take the heat" by ordering them to desegregate.349 In turn, if
school boards developed a desegregation plan, the judges were "willing to approve
almost anything submitted."3"
The situation raised the concerns expressed recently by the Court in New York v.
United States35-- except here, the Court's own decision in Brown II, rather than
an act of Congress, violated the "etiquette of federalism" '352 by "commandeering"
the local authorities.353 The Court had no alternative, but the lesson is clear:
cooperation is consistent with federalism only if the federal mandate is popular or
at least neutral. As a practical matter, the Court needed the states' cooperation; as
a political matter, the states needed the Court to make clear to the public that
"cooperation" was really coercion. Although the states retained practical
responsibility for implementing Brown, perhaps Cooper allowed the Court to relieve
the states of some of the political responsibility for Brown's implementation.
Brown II said "desegregation, hopefully with state support." Cooper said
"desegregation, even without state support." But desegregation could not occur
without schools. The real crisis in federalism occurred not when Governor Faubus
sent in the National Guard in 1957, but when he withdrew all state support by
closing the schools in 1958."54 Ironically, it was closure of the schools, not the
deployment of troops, that eventually made desegregation possible. The ordinary
Little Rock citizen who preferred education for their children over a vindication of
347. See id
348. See id
349. See id.
350. Id at 129.
351. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down a congressional effort to compel action by state governing officials
because it blurred state political accountability to state residents and masked the ultimate accountability of
federal officials). In New York. the Court presented an "autonomy model" of federalism; that is, the federal
government can preempt state regulation, but it may not "commandeer" state officials in order to implement a
federal agenda. See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State
Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1004-05 (1995).
352. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624. 1642 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (referring to New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)).
353. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161.
354. See id
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"states' rights," averted the crisis and made Brown at least viable in the context of
federalism.
VI. THE DEMISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE
The Southern Manifesto and the state interposition resolutions fulfilled Madison's
prophecy in The Federalist Papers: "A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more
in the members of Congress than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures of
the particular States." '355 Indeed, the Little Rock Crisis and the entire phenomena
of Massive Resistance were also predicted by Madison:
[S]hould an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be unpopular in
particular States, ... or even a warrantable measure be so, ... the means of
opposition to it are powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the people; their
repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the officers of the Union;
the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created
by legislative devices, which would often be added on such occasions .... and
where the sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison,
would present obstructions which the federal government would hardly be
willing to encounter.356
Only when Massive Resistance became more "unpopular" (to borrow Madison's
term) than Brown, would Massive Resistance ultimately meet its doom.
This Section briefly describes how Brown became more popular, both in the
southern states-thus ending Massive Resistance and leading to "token
integration"-and in the national arena-allowing for the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964157 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.35 Popular support,
federal enforcement and financial incentives, and black political power in the South
provided the ingredients missing in the Court's experiment in federalism.
A. Change in Public Opinion
Massive Resistance lost the initiative in southern politics when the assault on
public education and the threat to the entire social structure and economic future of
the South caused the emergence of a moderation movement. The future of public
education and the stability of the governmental process replaced segregation and
integration as the central issues.359 Educators began to openly challenge state
policy.3" Interposition disappeared from the urban press.361  Southern
institutions, such as churches, unions, schools, and businesses, began to pull the
South toward conformity with national norms and urged politicians to abandon
355. Tnm FEDERAIJST No. 46, at 296 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
356. Id at 297-98.
357. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000h-6 (1994). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 permitted the Justice Department to
bring suit for "the orderly achievement of desegregation in public education." Id § 2000c-6. School districts that
were found in violation of administrative desegregation guidelines could have their federal funds suspended. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2001 (1994).
358. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973p (1994).
359. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 320.
360. See id
361. See id at 321.
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interposition. 362  Klarman refers to the demise of Massive Resistance as
"pocketbook ethics"-i.e., "business leaders and parents of school children proving
unwilling to shoulder the costs of school closures and social instability.
Thus, outlawing school closings had both public and judicial support. Token
desegregation began in Virginia, and candidates backed by the supporters of
Massive Resistance lost at the polls.' 4  In addition, after Virginia Governor
Almond closed the public schools to prevent desegregation, thousands of white
parents, teachers, and business leaders asked him to reopen the schools.365 On
January 19, 1959, both a Virginia state court and a federal court found that the
closing of schools and the withholding of state funds were violations of the state or
federal constitutions.3"
Similarly, in Arkansas on February 23, 1959, the Little Rock Chamber of
Commerce voted to reopen the high schools "on a controlled minimum plan of
integration acceptable to the Federal Courts."36  In the summer of 1959, a
moderate Little Rock school board voted to reopen the high schools that had been
closed since the fall of 1958. 36' At the same time, the federal court in Little Rock
declared the school closing and fund withholding laws unconstitutional.369 Little
Rock desegregated its white public high schools in August 1959.370 Although
Faubus remained opposed and the segregationist opposition remained strong, this
time the school board received public support.371 The movement against
interposition in the Deep South took longer and at times was more violent than the
situations in Virginia and Arkansas.372
However, the demise of Massive Resistance in the late 1950s did not mean that
Brown was obeyed-it just meant that Brown was no longer widely and openly
defied. The rhetoric faded and the violence lessened. For example, after the two
362. See id at 293. 322.
363. Klarman, supra note 79, at 812. As commentators Jack Newfield and Jeff Greenfield have noted, the
one thing that runs deeper than fear is self-interest. See JACK NEWFIELD & JEFF GREENFIEaD, A POPULIST
MANIFESTO: THE MAKINO OF A NEW MAJORrrY 19 (1972).
364. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 323, 326. Additionally, Orfield stated:
Philosophic statements about state sovereignty and the attempt to find a "legal" way to avoid
the Supreme Court decision were fine with most white Virginians, but closed schools were
another thing. With 13,000 children suddenly locked out of public schools, and only a
fraction of them able to find places in private classrooms, opinion began to change. By a
small margin, the state [Parent Teacher Association (PTA)] turned against Massive Resistance,
and the Committee to Preserve Public Schools drew growing support in the Washington
suburbs.
ORFIEL, supra note 12, at 215-16.
365. See ORFIELD. supra note 12, at 214-15.
366. See id. at 217; see also James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va. 1959); Harrison v. Day, 106
S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1959).
367. PELTASON, supra note 117, at 202.
368. See id at 204-05.
369. See Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ark.), afrd, Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959).
370. See PELTASON, supra note 117, at 205-07.
371. See id at 206-07.
372. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 331-39.
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court decisions in January 1959,373 the Virginia Assembly repealed the most
extreme of its Massive Resistance laws, relying on the pupil placement plans to
delay integration.374 Yet, at the time the Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed, 98% of
all black students in Virginia remained in segregated schools.3 7  By 1960, less
than 1% of the South's black students attended integrated schools, and in Alabama,
Mississippi, and South Carolina, not a single public school was integrated. 37 6 It
was not until 1964 that Congress authorized the use of executive branch power and
the withholding of federal funds to make Brown a reality in the schools of the
South.3"
B. Change in Federal Response
In the years following Brown, the Civil Rights Movement demanded national
action and insisted that black rights would be denied until the structure of federalism
was altered to use national power to balance local intolerance. 37 1 Unfortunately,
there was no widespread political support to enforce Brown. In May 1963, a great
confrontation took place in the streets of Birmingham, Alabama, making vivid for
a shocked and angered public what the Civil Rights Movement had been claiming
373. See James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va. 1959) (Virginia's school closing and fund-
withholding laws violated the United States Constitution); Harrison v. Day, 106 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1959)
(Virginia's school closing and fund-withholding laws violated the state constitution).
374. See BARTLEY, supra note 71, at 340.
375. See ORFIELD, supra note 12, at 217-18. Counting the number of black children attending "white
schools" is a rough way to gauge the degree to which a state was obeying Brown. To the extent that the civil
rights attorneys implementing Brown were arguing for integration, then these numbers provide some guidance
on the success of their efforts. However, keep in mind the declaration of Malcolm X: "So, what the
integrationists, in my opinion, are saying, when they say that whites and blacks must go to school together, is
that the whites are so much superior that just their presence in a black classroom balances it out. I can't go
along with that." MALCOLM X, BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY: SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS AND A LETTER 16-17
(1970).
Recently, we have seen the return of the "separate but equal" doctrine--this time from the lips of civil rights
activists. See Steven A. Holmes, Look Who's Saying Separate Is Equal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1995, at El,
available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS database, 1995 WL 9668510, at *1 (describing academics' and liberal
policymakers' turn from integration as a goal toward enhancing institutions that are predominately black). For
an early advocacy of this position, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976) (he proper question concerning
school desegregation plans is whether "those plans will improve the education received by the children
affected."). Bell criticizes those lawyers who "are making decisions, setting priorities, and undertaking
responsibilities that should be determined by their clients and shaped by the community." Id at 512. But see
Kenneth B. Clark & Michael Meyers, Separate Is Never Equal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1995, at A2, available in
WESTLAW, ALLNEWS database, 1995 WL 2169022, at *1; Michael Meyers, Cornell's Insult to Brown
Decision, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1996, at A14, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS database, 1996 WL-WSJ
3103355 (Cornell's support of segregated "ethnic" dormitories symbolizes the "triumph of separate but equal
in the guise of liberal education.").
376. See GOLDFIEID, supra note 137, at 114.
377. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade the use of federal funds in a segregated school and authorized
the Attorney General to bring lawsuits on behalf of black children. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1994). Within
a year, almost every southern school district had at least minimal integration and the violence was isolated. See
ORFIELD, supra note 12, at 3.
378. See ORFm.D, supra note 12, at 32.
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for almost a decade.3 9 Newspaper pictures and television film informed the
nation of the viciousness of Eugene ("Bull") Connor's police force in Birmingham,
"creat[ing] a powerful symbol of lawless localism." 380 Constitutional abstractions
about states' rights were one thing, dogs and cops attacking peaceful protesters were
another.81 This confrontation, so vividly captured on film and relayed to living
rooms throughout the nation, made possible an alteration in federalism that had
eluded civil rights leaders for many years. 3 2 Polls taken two months before the
Birmingham incident and one month after revealed a twelve-fold increase in the
number of Americans believing that civil rights was the most urgent national
issue.383 Even in the South a majority favored federal action affecting blacks in
the areas of "jobs, voting rights, and public accommodations. '3sa
This radical shift in public opinion influenced Congress to introduce a number of
bills demanding the end of federal subsidies to segregated schools.8 5 President
Kennedy sensed the change in public opinion and called for enormous strengthening
of federal authority to enforce civil rights.386 After the assassination of President
Kennedy, the civil rights bill became a martyr's mission .3" Upon taking office,
President Johnson pledged to civil rights leaders that the bill would pass.3" The
President, congressional leadership, and the public, all recognizing that protection
of black Americans' rights was a national issue, created a convergence of consent
that had been lacking in the 1950s when Brown was decided. 38'
In 1965, President Johnson signed into law the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act which channeled more than $1 billion dollars of federal aid into
school districts containing low-income children, a measure that would effect over
379. See id
380. Id at 33.
381. See id
382. The role of television in the 1960s reveals how "reputation," by policing state and federal actors, can
allow federalism to protect individual rights. See id Cf. DoUGLAs G. BAIRD ET AL, GAME THEORY AND THE
LAW 57 (1994) ("[M]echanisms such as reputation can bring about long-term cooperation .... ").
The Birmingham incident was used to rally nationwide support for federal civil rights legislation, even in
the southern states, in the same way that Shays' Rebellion was used to stimulate support for the federal
Constitutional Convention, see FORREST McDoNALD, Novus ORDO SE LORUM: THE INTELLECTuAL ORIGINS
OF THE CONSTrrnON 177-78 (1985) (describing the manipulation of the Shays' incident to garner support for
a stronger national government).
383. See ORFIELD, supra note 12, at 36.
384. Id
385. See id at 33.
386. See id at 35.
387. See id at 39.
388. See id
389. At the time Brown was decided, there was no national consensus that segregation should be banished.
See generally ORFIE.D, supra note 12, at 15-16. Due in large part to Massive Resistance, in which the
segregationists violently and blatantly overresponded to Brown, a national consensus had formed by the early
1960s-a consensus that led to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id at 36. This phenomenon has occurred
before in American history. In the 1830's abolitionists were a small group, but due to the southern over-
response to their weak presence, the abolitionist position was strengthened and grew into the Republican Party.
See WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS
508 (1996).
390. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6301-8962 (1994)).
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90% of all school districts.39 In a memo written to the President two days after
the Education Act was signed, the Federal Commissioner of Education noted that
"Title VI [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] can become less of a negative threat and
more of a condition necessary to progress in the future."3" The Education Act
provided strong federal leverage for enforcement of Brown's desegregation
mandate, demonstrating that a federal mandate (Brown) plus money could produce
the federal-state cooperation that Brown II failed to inspire. To the extent that
success is measured by the number of black children attending school with whites,
the federal legislation was successful.393
As Archibald Cox has pointed out, Brown provides the lesson that "there are
limits to the power of even the Supreme Court to command assent. '"3' On the
tenth anniversary of Brown, a mere 1% of black school children in the southern
states were attending public school with white children; by the twentieth anniversary
of Brown, after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the
Supreme Court's final rejection of state schemes to evade desegregation 395 and
approval of busing, over 46% of the black children in the southern states were
attending schools in which the majority of children were white.396 According to
Kluger, "[n]o other sector of the nation had achieved anything near that degree of
desegregation. ' 39
In the final analysis of the southern response to Brown, it is difficult to judge the
Court's efforts to make federalism "work" for individual rights because a large
number of the citizens of each state--citizens who would have favored the Court's
compromise from the beginning-were disenfranchised. According to Klarman,
14%-49% (in most states, over 25%) of the electorate favorably inclined towards
Brown were politically excluded. 398  Klarman argues that the racial climate that
made Brown a judicial possibility also could have rendered Brown unnecessary if
black voting rights-and, thus, black influence on state governments-had been
391. See ORFIELD, supra note 12, at 94.
392. IL
393. The number of blacks in school with whites increased from less than 2% in 1964 to over 90% by 1972.
See ROSENBERG, supra note 127, at 50. Rosenberg concludes that the increase in federal funds-with federal
aid in some southern school districts constituting one-third of the school budget--caused this increase in
desegregation. See id. at 98-99; see also ORFiELD, supra note 12, at 228 (Desegregation "would have been
impossible without the lure of money from the Elementary & Secondary Education Act."). However, Paul E.
Peterson gives the Elementary & Secondary Education Act less glowing reviews, and, focusing on the broader
redistributive goals of the Act, finds that its success in "securing state and local compliance with these...
(goals] has been mixed." PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 84-85 (1981).
394. ARCHBALD Cox, THE WARREN CouR. CONSTITUTIONAL DECmsION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM
26 (1968).
395. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) ("The burden on a school board today is to
come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now.").
396. See KLUGER, supra note 29, at 758, 768.
397. l1& at 768.
398. See Klarman, supra note 79, at 808. Thus, it is unclear which had a more powerful impact on the
implementation of Brown--enfranchising blacks or bribing the states with federal subsidies. As John Ferejohn
has pointed out, depending on what the answer to that question is, there are different consequences for
federalism. Cf. i at 810-12.
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strictly enforced.39' While it is impossible to predict whether Massive Resistance
would have occurred if black voting rights had been strictly enforced, its clear that
Brown was not strictly enforced until blacks gained political power.' In this
regard, the political process theory of footnote four of United States v. Carolene
Products, Co."' aids in answering the question, in terms of federalism, of where
should one place the primary protection of individuals rights.4°2 If the individuals
have a voice in state politics, perhaps it is best left to the states.4° If not, then the
Supreme Court must step in. The discouraging lesson of Brown is that the former
is far more effective for securing individual rights than the latter.
399. See id at 805.
400. Seeid at 811.
401. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). See supra note 92 for the text of footnote four.
402. Although the Declaration of Independence stated that the purpose of government was to protect
inalienable rights, the federalism question is which government (national or state) has primary responsibility for
doing so. The pre-Fourteenth Amendment model of federalism relied on federal-state institutional boundaries
to protect individual rights. The state governments were supposed to protect the citizens of their state from the
national government. See THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("The State legislatures, who will always be not only vigilant but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights
of the citizens against encroachments from the federal government, will constantly have their attention awake
to the conduct of the national lers... ."); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era
of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 871 (1986).
Prior to the Civil War, the states defined the status and provided the protection of the rights of individuals.
This strategy did not work for blacks: due to prejudice and the absence of black influence in politics, there was
no identity of interests between blacks and the states in which they dwelled. See Kaczorowski, supra, at 871.
The outcome of the Civil War, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Fourteenth Amendment established the
primacy of national citizenship, and thus the federal government had ultimate sovereignty and primary authority
to determine the status and secure the rights of all Americans. See id at 874; see also Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1501 (1987). McConnell explains:
"After Brown v. Board of Education and the various civil rights acts ... it is the federal government, not the
states, that appears to be our system's primary protector of individual liberties. This seems to be the premise
of the Fourteenth Amendment and of much of New Deal legislation." McConnell, supra, at 1501.
403. In light of recent conservative federal court rulings, those who consider the federal government as the
superior or only champion of minority interests should reconsider their assumptions. See, e.g., Pace Jefferson
McConkie, Civil Rights and Federalism Fights: Is There a "More Perfect Union" for the Heirs to the Promise
of Brown?. 1996 B.Y.U. L. REv. 389, 402 (1996) ("[A]s today's conservative judiciary and congressional
majority increasingly exhibit a 'New Harshness,' the federal government cannot necessarily be looked to as a
civil rights sanctuary. Thus, a positive role for federalism in the protecting of civil rights should be secured.");
Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability:
Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REv. 19, 27 (1989) ("At last count more than 450 published
state court opinions interpret state constitutions as going beyond federal constitutional guarantees."). See
generally William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School
Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1151 (1995); Yvonne
Kauger, Reflections on Federalism Protections Afforded by State Constitutions, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 1 (1992);
Judith S. Kaye. Foreword-" The Common Law and State Constitutional Law as Full Partners in the Protection
of Individual Rights, 23 RUTGERs LJ. 727 (1992).
This is not to say that the states have become racial Xanadus. See, e.g., Bible Backed Slavery, Says A Lawmaker,
N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1996, at A20, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, NYT File. (Alabama state senator,
Charles Davidson, in a speech prepared for a debate over his proposal to fly the Confederate battle flag atop the
State Capitol, recently argued "that slavery was justified by the Bible and that it was good for blacks.").
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Gerald N. Rosenberg, in his book investigating the degree to which judicial
processes can be used to produce political and social change,' relies on empirical
data to conclude that "the Supreme Court contributed virtually nothing to ending
segregation of the public schools in the [s]outhern states in the decade following
Brown." 0 I agree with Rosenberg that the federal legislation in the 1960s was
able to bring about more change than Brown functioning alone.406 Indeed,
Rosenberg's empirical dataw support my view that if the legislative and executive
branches had been more supportive of Brown in the 1950s, the Court's
implementation efforts, based on compromise and cooperation, might have produced
different results. However, by denying that Brown directly or indirectly impacted
the Civil Rights Movement, Rosenberg ignores the fact that the Brown litigation was
first and foremost legal reform, not social reform. The NAACP was not working in
a vacuum-for over fifty years, the Supreme Court had interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment to permit legal segregation and that jurisprudence had to be changed
before non-judicial social reform could advance. By striking down state-imposed
segregation, the Court altered the character of the later direct-action efforts, such as
sit-ins, marches, and boycotts. After Brown and Cooper, segregationists were the
outlaws and the civil rights advocates were the law upholders. Without Brown, these
roles would have been reversed.'
Some commentators have suggested that there is a silver-lining in the southern
response to Brown. Daniel Elazar opines that the resistance to Brown by the states
had an affirmative aspect-it created, albeit through a long, painful process, a
consensus that "mark[ed] a major change in the attitudes of the dominant groups in
those states"-a change, he argues, that would have been much harder to attain with
404. According to Rosenberg, courts are limited by three constraints built into the structure of the American
political system: (1) the limited nature of constitutional rights, (2) the lack of judicial independence, and (3)
the judiciary's lack of powers of implementation. See ROSENBERG, supra note 127, at 35.
405. Id at 52 (emphasis in original). This data excludes the border states in which the numbers reveal, as
Rosenberg admits, that "the Supreme Court's actions appear to have had an effect." Id. at 51.
Mark Tushnet questions Rosenberg's and Klarman's critique of Brown because their "observations take as
uncontroversial the proposition that Brown's success can be measured by the extent to which African-American
children sat next to white children in their schools." Mark Tushnet, The Significance of Brown v. Board of
Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 173, 176 (1994). As Tushnet points out, when Brown is viewed as an effort to
establish a fundamental principle of constitutional law, as opposed to accomplish actual integration, "the claim
that Brown was a success is far more plausible." Id.
406. See ROSENBERG, supra note 127, at 94-102. Rosenberg notes that, as compared to the decade following
Brown, in the post-1964 years there was a great deal of change in civil rights. See id at 94-95. Rosenberg also
argues that the changes thatoccurred are explained by his theoretical framework--the political climate had changed,
the social and cultural environment changed, and non-court actors had begun to offer incentives to induce
compliance with court orders. See id at 96-106. Cf. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Social Construction
ofBrown v. Board of Education: Law Reform and the Reconstructive Paradox, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 547.568-
69 (1995) (The litigation strategy, as part of social reform, was utilized too early in Brown.).
407. See ROSENBERG, supra note 127, at 94-105.
408. In addition, Brown provided Congress with jurisdiction for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which, because it authorized the Justice Department to initiate desegregation lawsuits, obviously was enacted
in direct response to Brown.
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only decrees issued from a centralized source.409 Put another way, the diffusion
of governmental power both "prolonged the struggle" and "contributed to the
durability of the ultimate outcome.!10 Klarman argues that the violence of
Massive Resistance, by shaming the nation, hastened civil rights reform.4" In my
view, it is a very thin lining in a very large, dark cloud.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Civil Rights Movement is accused of (and praised for) killing federalism, but
federalism is not dead, nor should it be.4 In the context of education in
particular, federalism principles are protected by the Court's need for local
cooperation of state officials and by the role of local federal judges." 3 The
national government, through the Court, may be the primary protector of individual
liberties, but the state governments are still the primary providers of public
education." 4 The relationship between the two sovereigns in this area has been
a fluid one over the past forty years, as evidenced by Brown II, Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education,45 Milliken v. Bradley,416 and the recent
409. See DANIEL J. EL&zAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 11-14 (3d ed. 1984).
Elazar further notes that "it is the nature of American federalism that once a new consensus is achieved, these
matters are again entrusted to the states and their local populations." Ia at 14.
410. DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 105 (1995).
411. See generally Klarman, supra note 153. at 129-49.
412. Federalism continues to provide important values: a federal system prevents concentrated power at
either governmental level, national or local; it promotes republican values (citizens are more likely to participate
in politics at the local level); as in business, competition brings vibrancy and health to the governmental arena;
and decentralized government promotes diversity, allowing experimental solutions to be tested. See Stewart,
supra note 16, at 918.
413. See Kramer. supra note 118, at 1493 (The need for "administrative sharing" is one of the "most
important institutions of federalism.").
414. The Court is still grappling with this issue. In its most recent school desegregation case, the Court found
that certain district court orders were beyond the court's remedial authority. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. C.
2038 (1995). The Court reemphasized that, pursuant to principles of federalism, "federal supervision of local
school systems was intended as a temporary measure[,]" id at 2049 (citing Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City
Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237. 247 (1991)); that "local autonomy of school districts is a vital national
tradition[,]" id at 2054; and that district courts "must strive to restore state and local authorities to the control
of a school system operating in compliance with the Constitution[i" id Justice Thomas, reviewing the Court's
school desegregation cases, has complained that the federal courts have "trampled upon principles of
federalism[,]" Id at 2062 (Thomas, J., concurring), and that the Court has "not permitted constitutional principles
such as federalism ... to stand in the way of our drive to reform schools[,]" id at 2066 (Thomas. J.,
concuning).
State and local authorities are balking at federal mandates in non-racial educational areas, such as special
education, gender-role discrimination, asbestos removal, school recycling programs, and safe drinking water tests.
See Gregory A. Fossedal, Help for Schools? Try Deregulation, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1996. at A22, avai/able
in WESTLAW. WSJ database, 1996 WL-WSJ 3096404, at *1-2. The Republican National Convention Platform
for 1996 proclaimed: "We will abolish the Deparunent of Education, [and) end Federal meddling in our
schools." Excerpts from Platorm Adopted by Republican Nation Convention, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1996, at
A12, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, NYT Fde.
415. 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (setting forth appropriate standards for district court remedial orders in cases
involving racially discriminatory state actions).
416. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that it was improper for the courts to impose a multi-district remedy for
single district de jure segregation in the absence of findings that the neighboring school districts had
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Missouri v. Jenkins.4 17 Brown II gave the states the primary responsibility to
implement Brown and to the extent that the states abdicated that responsibility, the
federal government became more involved; but to the extent that a state fulfills its
obligations, the need for federal government intervention diminishes.
Unfortunately, in the 1950s there were few "enlightened statesmen at the
helm"" of the southern states, and a mere "do the right thing" directive from the
Court was not sufficient to induce the states to comply with Brown. The Court's
strategy of offering compromise in exchange for cooperation was undermined once
it became clear that the executive and legislative branches of the federal government
were not going to enforce Brown. In game theory terminology, the Court was
operating in a "no-liability regime" even after Brown and, thus, the Court's ruling
was ineffective."1 9 In the 1960s, the federal government went from a "no-liability
regime" to a "liability regime" (through the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965), altering the choices made by the states by changing the
outcomes because there was now a cost, or "liability," for non-compliance.
Orfield concludes that the "reordering of race relations in southern schools,"
albeit slow and incomplete, "was, in the context of American federalism, a
remarkable achievement." 2  The question is, in terms of federalism, an
achievement at what price? Because of the manipulation in the 1950s of the states'
rights argument in order to shroud racist attitudes in constitutional garb, like pure
white hooded-sheets, any federalism argument today promoting states' rights stands
open to charges of bigotry.421 To the extent that the utterance of "federalism" may
elicit a disdainful glance from a listener, it appears that the real failure of Brown's
experiment in federalism is that, despite the Court's intentions, the experiment
triggered events that tarnished the reputation of the very constitutional doctrine the
Court sought to protect.422
intentionally fostered segregation and without allowing those districts to present evidence on the question of the
alleged Constitutional violations).
417. 115 S. C. 2038 (1995) (attracting nonminority students from outside school district to schools within
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418. T7E FEDERAUST No. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961) (Madison advocated a
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419. See BAIRD Er AL. supra note 382. at 1-31 (describing strategic behavior and impact of different regimes
of liability on strategic behavior).
420. ORFImD, supra note 12, at 355.
421. See, e.g., AmoAn. M. ' ERNmOM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY
VOTING RIGHTS 89 (1987) (During a House Hearing on the Voting Rights Act in 1981, Jesse Jackson remarked
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So, what of the current rhetoric that employs images from the era of Massive
Resistance in order to criticize supporters of affirmative action? While it is probably
healthy for the nation that our collective memory of the brutality and hypocrisy of
the racial caste of that era is fading, such healing does not provide a license to throw
salty phrases like "Massive Resistance" onto our nation's scars. The current debate
over affirmative action policies is a heated one, and the hysterical, misguided, or
disingenuous use of rhetoric should be avoided. In any event, in light of the
historical meaning of the phrase "Massive Resistance"-a meaning steeped in
federalism concepts-it seems clear that it is inappropriate to transpose that term
from the past to the present. No one is questioning the federal government's
authority to decide racial issues in education. "Massive Disagreement" would be
a more apt phrase. Does Brown mean that race is an illegitimate basis for
governmental decisions or does it mean that race is an illegitimate basis for
governmental decisions that subordinate minority groups? The Court's
jurisprudence, which is divided on this question, reflects the complexities of this
current debate. "Massive Resistance," like the spirit and events that engendered it,
should likewise remain a part of history-the phrase has no place in the present.
